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Student Protector, Internet Provider, or Contractual Party?
An Examination of the Legal Relationship Between
a University and its Students
Anna Christine Milot†

Introduction

ment? Or, on the other hand, is the university legally
obliged to protect the rights to freedom of expression
and to privacy of the student viewing the online pornography?
In order to respond to these questions, three separate issues will be examined:
(1) What is the relationship between a university
and Student A — the viewer of the pornography? Can a
university regulate a student’s online conduct, and if so,
which, if any, of the student’s rights are affected?
(2) If a university can regulate a student’s online
conduct, but does not do so, can it incur liability? Does a
university as an Internet Service Provider (ISP) have a
responsibility to control e-mail use, access to Web sites,
and the contents of files publicly available through file
sharing programs?
(3) Thirdly, what different legal obligations exist —
under contract law, tort law, the Canadian Criminal
Code, 3 or other statutes — on a university with respect
to its relationship with Student B — the student
claiming sexual harassment? Should a university, on any
of these grounds, take responsibility for Internet content
regulation in residences?
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A

student, behind the closed door of a private singleoccupancy residence room, uses his or her personal
computer connected to the university’s residence network to view online pornographic materials. The activities of this student are known to other students in the
residence. 1 The situation makes others in the residence
uncomfortable. Should the student involved be sanctioned? If yes, under what authority, and by whom? Does
the university have a role in preventing and prohibiting
this type of behaviour?
The legal relationship between a university and its
students is becoming increasingly complex as the use of
technology spreads. 2 Accordingly, it is important to
define a university’s responsibilities and legal boundaries
in order to understand the liability universities can
potentially incur when dealing with students. Each
Canadian university is unique in its founding and
enacting legislation, as will be discussed further later.
The individuality of Canada’s universities means that the
questions raised in this paper cannot be given answers
that can necessarily be generalized across universities.
The approach to analysis in this paper, however, is applicable to any of the Canadian universities. Therefore, this
paper will demonstrate the analysis appropriate to any
university’s legal relationship between itself and its students with respect to the use of the Internet by students
in residence, occasionally using the specific example of
the legislative and regulating environment surrounding
the University of Western Ontario.
More specifically, this paper will ask: does the private viewing of online pornography by a student in his
or her residence room constitute an act of sexual harassment, and if it does, is a university legally obliged to
protect the other residential students from this harass-

The Relationship Between a
University and Student A
(the viewer)
Can a University Regulate a Student’s
Online Conduct?

I

n keeping with the historic tradition of universities
being founded by royal charter, and consistent with
the lack of provincial and federal statutes with applica-
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tion to universities, every university in Canada, 4 except
those in British Columbia, 5 operates under its own private provincial or territorial statute that specifies internal
rules and regulations. Provinces have constitutional
authority under section 93 of the Constitution Act,
1867 6 to approve the creation of a university statute.
Case law 7 confirms provincial authority over university
statutes under sections 92(13), 8 92(14), 9 and 92(16) 10 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 as well.
The enacting statute of each university stipulates the
responsibilities of various university bodies, including
the Board of Governors and the Senate. The role of the
Board of Governors and the Senate of each university in
Canada varies. For example, under the U.W.O. Act,
1982, 11 the control of the University of Western Ontario
and its property and affairs are vested in the 28-member
Board of Governors, and academic policy is the responsibility of the 103-member Senate. Authority over student
residences, in particular, is given to both the Board of
Governors and to the Senate under three different sections of the Act. 12
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Similarly, Parts 6 and 7 of the University of British
Columbia Act stipulate the role and responsibilities of
the Board of Governors and the Senate, respectively.
With respect to students in residence, the Board of Governors is given the authority, upon consultation with and
approval of the Senate, to:
. . . maintain and keep in proper order and condition the
real property of the university, to erect and maintain the
buildings and structures on it that in the opinion of the
board are necessary and advisable, and to make rules
respecting the management, government and control of the
real property, buildings and structures 13

and to:
. . . determine the number of students that may in the
opinion of the board, having regard to the resources available, be accommodated in the university or in any faculty of
it, and to make rules considered advisable for limiting the
admission or accommodation of students to the number so
determined[.] 14

As per their statutory obligations, the Board of Governors and the Senates, 15 or other governing authorities
of Canadian universities, enact internal university documents that are enforced by committees which are delegated that power. 16 These internal documents dictate
policies and procedures that are meant, by the administration of the universities involved, to be adhered to by
all members of the university community, including the
students. 17
However, upon close examination, it may be
revealed that there is no direct link between such
internal policies of a university and its students. This is
the case, for example, at the University of Western
Ontario, where section 2 of the U.W.O. Act, 1982 enumerates to whom the Act applies:
The University, commonly known as ‘‘Western’’, the Board
and Senate and the statutes and regulations of, appointments in and affiliation of colleges with, the University,

existing at the time this Act comes into force, are and each
of them is hereby continued, subject to this Act.

The university, the Board of Governors, the Senate,
the employees of the university and its colleges, and the
statutes and regulations of the university must all comply
with the U.W.O. Act, 1982. Interpreting the statute
strictly, however, students are not part of the university
since they are not mentioned specifically under section 2
of the Act. Therefore, under the authority of the Act, as
strictly interpreted, it would appear that students are not
specifically bound by any policies created by a university
body pursuant to its power under the U.W.O. Act, 1982.
This problem has been overcome by the courts,
which have decided that a university can regulate students and their activities in both academic and nonacademic matters, 18 and that, in particular, for the purposes of this discussion, universities can regulate student
residences. For example, in Morgan v. Acadia University, 19 the Court held that the Board of Governors is the
‘‘vehicle to administer internal university discipline.’’ 20
Morgan involved a provision under paragraph 8(a) of the
Act of Incorporation of Acadia University 21 that gave the
Board of Governors the:
control and management of the property and funds of the
said corporation, and [. . .] the power to adopt and carry into
effect by-laws, resolutions and regulations touching and concerning the instruction, care, government and discipline of
the students of said university [. . .].

In that case, Acadia University had a Student Handbook that dealt with drugs and alcohol. Specifically, this
Handbook stated that ‘‘The consumption of alcoholic
beverages in residence is governed by the Liquor Control
Act of Nova Scotia. Students under the age of 19 are not
permitted to consume alcohol. Open liquor in any area
of the residences other than students’ rooms is illegal.’’ 22
While the Court held that the university had no jurisdiction to administer the Liquor Control Act, Grant J. also
stated that:
The University has the right and the duty to maintain discipline on campus and in residence. Public and private funds
are involved in building and maintaining residences. Discipline, with regulations, must be in place and enforced. Property must be protected and students must have the right to
study and live under the residence rules. Those who choose
to break the rules must be disciplined. 23

Therefore, the university was within its power to
punish the plaintiff who had been caught with an open
bottle of beer in a residence hallway. Although this case
specifically concerned an illegal activity, the Court spoke
generally of a university’s power to dictate and enforce
rules regarding students’ non-academic behaviour in residence.
More specifically related to this article, in Glynn v.
Keele University, 24 a British court held that a university
had the power to sanction students for non-academic
behaviour that harassed other students and members of
the university community. In this case, the plaintiff had
appeared naked on campus. Section 6, paragraph 3 of the
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statutes of the University of Keele provided: ‘‘The ViceChancellor shall have the general responsibility to the
Council for maintaining and promoting the efficiency
and good order of the University.’’ More specifically,
under section 6, paragraph 4, the Vice-Chancellor had
the authority to ‘‘suspend any Student from any class or
classes and [to] exclude any Student from any part of the
University or its precincts. . .’’. Accordingly, the Chancellor fined the student and forbade him residency oncampus because of behaviour that had ‘‘offended many
members and employees of the University and residences on campus. It ha[d] also offended many people
outside the University both locally and nationally.’’ 25
Although the Court, under Pennycuick V-C, held that
the vice-chancellor did not comply with the requirements of natural justice because he did not give the
plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, in the end the
Court held that ‘‘there is no doubt that the offence was
one of a kind which merited a severe penalty according
to any standards current even today. I have no doubt
that the sentence of exclusion of residence in the campus
was a proper penalty in respect of that offence.’’ 26 The
university, therefore, was justified in administering punishment for behaviour that was indirectly harassing
others, including other students.

than substantive matters. In most cases, the reason cited
by the courts for not interfering with university matters
was that an adequate internal review and appeals structure was already in place. 30
Under statutory power provided by the provinces,
and with an affirmation by the courts that a university
can regulate students’ academic and non-academic behaviour in residences, it can be concluded that Canadian
universities have the authority to create and enforce
internal university policies and procedures that must be
adhered to by students. 31
On the other hand, it is important to note that a
university has the potential to violate a student’s rights
by asserting its authority over particular academic and
non-academic behaviour. In other words, if a university
decides to regulate Student A’s online behaviour in the
situation outlined in this article, could Student A have a
claim against the university for a violation of his or her
rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 32 or under the general rubric of privacy law?

In support of the position that universities have the
power to govern student conduct is the fact that courts
have determined that university legislation must be
interpreted broadly. For example, in Healey v. Memorial
University of Newfoundland, 27 Justice L.D. Barry held
that:

Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms
One might ask the question, if a university limits a
student’s ability to access online pornography in residence, could this be argued to be in violation of the
fundamental right to freedom of expression found under
section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 33 (Charter)? However, it is not necessary to resolve
this issue here because, according to McKinney v. University of Guelph 34 and Harrison v. University of British
Columbia, 35 a university’s conduct does not fall under
Charter scrutiny. It is not a ‘‘government actor’’ and
therefore does not have to comply with Charter standards. 36
Even if a Charter standard were to be applied, a
university could argue, under section 1 of the Charter,
that Student B’s right to be free from sexual harassment
should reasonably place limits on the right of Student A
to freedom of expression. 37 For example, Ryerson University’s recognition of the principle of legitimate limitations on Charter rights is apparent in its Discrimination
and Harassment Prevention Policies and Procedures:

. . . the University has the legal authority to protect persons
and property. I accept that I should avoid interpreting the
University regulations in a fashion which would unduly
hamper the University in exercising that authority . . . the
courts should respect the intention of the Legislature that
internal problems be resolved by the University itself. The
courts should respect the traditional autonomy of Universities and not impose unnecessary legal formalism and trappings of courts which might mean that the University’s
internal regulation is less effective and more costly. The
cases make it clear that the courts should exercise restraint
and be slow to intervene in University affairs whenever it is
still possible for the University to corrects its errors with its
own institutional means. 28

And, lastly, courts have repeatedly affirmed a university’s jurisdiction over its own affairs by stating that the
judiciary should rarely interfere with internal university
regulations. In Dickason v. The University of Alberta, 29
Justice Cory (for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada) stated at paragraph 35 that ‘‘the role of universities in our society as self-governing centres of learning,
research and teaching safeguarded by academic freedom
is unique. The courts have respected this and over the
years have been very cautious in intervening in university affairs.’’ Various earlier cases also demonstrate that
courts are reluctant to interfere in internal university
matters unless there have been serious breaches of natural justice and, even then, the courts have attempted to
keep such interventions restricted to procedural rather

If a University Regulates Student A’s
Behaviour, What Rights Might It Violate?

Freedom of expression is the cornerstone of education at
Ryerson University, but like other Charter rights, it is not an
absolute right. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees ‘‘freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression, including freedom of the press and other media
of communication.’’ The rights and freedoms guaranteed in
the Charter are [under section 1] ‘‘. . . subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’’. 38

In addition, as stated previously, the Board of Governors and the Senate of each university in Canada have
statutory authority to create rules and regulations that
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will ensure the well-being of the university community,
and it could be argued that, in themselves, these rules
could be a proper limitation on Charter rights. The
Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Trial Division) held in
Morgan 39 that a ‘‘university has the right and the duty to
maintain discipline on campus and in residence.’’ 40
Thus, in this respect, it would appear that a university
has the power under Canadian legislation and jurisprudence to regulate the reception of information, including
pornography, in its residences. 41
At the moment, no university in Canada has a monitor system set up to detect the existence of pornography
in the students’ rooms. Universities have currently
adopted a reactive position; however, if a university
decides to become proactive and set up a surveillance
system to monitor the contents of a student’s room, is it
possible that although the student would be unsuccessful with a challenge based on the Charter, the university would alternatively be in violation of Student A’s
rights in terms of privacy?
Does Student A in Residence Have Privacy Rights?
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The privacy rights of a student may arrive in three
separate ways: by contract, under tort law, or by statute.

What Right to Privacy Does a Residence Student Have
Under Contract With the University of Western
Ontario?
The analysis in this area depends upon the contracts
each university has created and entered into with its
students in residence, and therefore the following discussion will focus on the University of Western Ontario as
an example. The actual residence contract between a
student and the University of Western Ontario does not
deal with privacy. In fact, the only internal university
document of relevance to a student in residence at the
University of Western Ontario that mentions privacy at
all is the Residents’ Handbook and Understandings 42
( Residents’ Handbook ). The Residents’ Handbook ,
which lays out the residence rules and regulations that a
student agrees to abide by when signing the residence
contract, explained more fully below, ambiguously states
that ‘‘each resident will show the utmost respect for
fellow residents’ privacy and property.’’ According to the
Residents’ Handbook, every area of each residence is
designated as public, private, or semi-private, and
damage charges are billed accordingly. While it is not
specified how a residence room is classified, it can be
assumed that it is regarded as being private or at least
semi-private. However, as will be expanded upon below,
a requirement for two parties to be in a licensor/licensee
relationship is for the licensee to not have exclusivity or
control over the property. And, as demonstrated below, a
university and its students in residence are in a
licensor/licensee relationship. Therefore, the privacy a
student has in his or her room is not absolute. As a result,
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Student A, if at the University of Western Ontario, has
no contractual right to privacy.

Does Student A Have an Entitlement to Privacy
Through Tort Law?
Traditionally, the common-law courts have relied
on well-established torts to indirectly provide a protection of privacy interests, rather than creating a specific
tort of privacy. 43 This has more recently been challenged
by cases such as Hunter v. Southam 44 and CorlettLockyer v. Stephens, 45 which can be argued to demonstrate that every Canadian has a reasonable expectation
to privacy.
Specifically, in Ontario, which arguably has the
most well-developed tort of invasion of privacy at
common law in Canada, courts have begun to say that
they will enforce a common-law tort of invasion of privacy, even in the absence of legislative support. 46 However, according to the Ontario Court (General Division)
in Roth v. Roth, 47 ‘‘whether the invasion of privacy of an
individual will be actionable will depend on the circumstances of the particular case and the conflicting rights
involved’’.
Overall, while jurisprudence surrounding the tort of
invasion of privacy is expanding, privacy law in Canada
is still uncertain. Therefore, any claim that Student A
may have against a university for violating his or her
right to privacy under tort law would be tenuous.
Can Student A Claim a Statutory Right to Privacy?
The Federal Privacy Act 48 only deals with protection
of privacy in respect to personal information. However,
the provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan have recognized a statutory tort of invasion of privacy. Section 1 of
the British Columbia Privacy Act 49 states:
(1) It is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a
person, wilfully and without a claim of right, to violate the
privacy of another.
(2) The nature and degree of privacy to which a person
is entitled in a situation or in relation to a matter is that
which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard
to the lawful interests of others.
(3) In determining whether the act or conduct of a
person is a violation of another’s privacy, regard must be
given to the nature, incidence and occasion of the act or
conduct and to any domestic or other relationship between
the parties.
(4) Without limiting subsections (1) to (3), privacy may
be violated by eavesdropping or surveillance, whether or not
accomplished by trespass.

Similarly, the Newfoundland Privacy Act 50 claims:
3. (1) It is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for
a person, wilfully and without a claim of right, to violate the
privacy of an individual.
(2) The nature and degree of privacy to which an individual is entitled in a situation or in relation to a matter is
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that which is reasonable in the circumstances, regard being
given to the lawful interests of others; and in determining
whether the act or conduct of a person constitutes a violation of the privacy of an individual, regard shall be given to
the nature, incidence, and occasion of the act or conduct
and to the relationship, whether domestic or other, between
the parties.

The Saskatchewan Privacy Act 51 simply states under
section 2 that ‘‘It is a tort, actionable without proof of
damage, for a person willfully and without claim of right,
to violate the privacy of another person.’’ Similarly, the
Manitoba Privacy Act 52 states under subsection 2(1) that
‘‘A person who substantially, unreasonably, and without
claim of right, violates the privacy of another person,
commits a tort against that person.’’ Finally, in Quebec,
there is a general right to privacy in the Quebec Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms 53 and the Quebec Civil
Code. 54 Article 5 of the Charter guarantees every person
the right to respect of his or her private life.
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On the other hand, the provinces of Alberta, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Prince Edward
Island do not have a statutory tort of invasion of privacy. 55 Therefore, a student viewing online pornography
in his or her private university residence room in one of
these provinces would not have any privacy statute to
which to appeal, should a university attempt to stop him
or her.
In summation, Student A would not have a possible
avenue of recourse against a university when being
stopped from viewing online pornography under contract if the contracts in existence at his or her university
are similar to those in place at the University of Western
Ontario. However, Student A may have a possible claim
under tort law, and a stronger claim under statute,
depending on his or her province of residence.
On the other hand, although a university has the
authority from its province and the courts to regulate a
student’s academic and non-academic behaviour, it can
be argued that it is nowhere directly compelled to use
this power. If a university does not regulate a student’s
online behaviour, could it be liable for not doing so?

Does a University Have a Public
Responsibility to Regulate a Student’s
Online Conduct?
The scenario presented earlier between Student A
and Student B deals with pornography. Pornography,
which is not defined in the Criminal Code, and the
possession of pornography, is therefore prima facie legal.
However, there are degrees of pornography and different
activities involving particular types of pornography that
have been criminalized in Canada. Therefore, one must
examine the responsibilities of a university with respect
to child pornography and obscenity, which have been
criminalized, in order to determine the full extent of

liability a university may incur through the activities of
Student A.

The Canadian Criminal Code
Section 163 of the Canadian Criminal Code reads:
(1) Every one commits an offense who
(a) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates, or
has in his possession for the purpose of publication,
distribution or circulation any obscene written
matter, picture, model, phonograph record or other
thing whatever [emphasis added]; . . .

The motives of the accused are not relevant (subsection 63(5)), 56 and ‘‘obscenity’’ is defined as ‘‘any publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue
exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of the
following subjects, namely crime, horror, cruelty and violence’’ (section 163(8)). In addition, section 163.1 states
that:
(2) Every person who makes, prints, publishes or possesses for the purpose of publication any child pornography
is guilty of [emphasis added]
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding ten years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(3) Every person who imports, distributes, sells or possesses for the purpose of distribution or sale any child pornography is guilty of [. . .] [emphasis added].
(4) Every person who possesses any child pornography
is guilty of [. . .] [emphasis added].

Child pornography is defined under section 163.1 as:
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was made by electronic or
mechanical means [emphasis added],
(i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as
being under the age of eighteen years and is
engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit
sexual activity, or
(ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the
depiction, for a sexual purpose, of a sexual
organ or the anal region of a person under the
age of eighteen years; or
(b) any written material or visual representation that
advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person
under the age of eighteen years that would be an
offence under this Act.

While no definition of ‘‘every one’’ or ‘‘person’’ is
provided in any of the sections mentioned above, section 2 of the Criminal Code states that these expressions,
and those similar, include:
Her Majesty and public bodies, bodies corporate, societies,
companies and inhabitants of counties, parishes, municipalities or other districts in relation to the acts and things that
they are capable of doing and owning respectively; [. . .].

A university, therefore, as an incorporated body, falls
under the category of ‘‘every one’’ and/or ‘‘person’’ under
section 2, and consequently may fall under the ambit of
sections 163 and 163.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code.
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Is a University, in Permitting the Activities of
Student A to Occur, Doing Anything That is
Prohibited Under These Criminal Code Sections?
Is a University ‘‘publishing’’, ‘‘distributing’’, or ‘‘circulating’’ within the meaning of section 163; ‘‘publishing’’ or ‘‘possessing’’ under subsection 163.1(3); or
‘‘possessing’’ under subsection 163.1(4)? 57 What is a university’s role in the information dissemination chain of
transfer that culminates in Student A’s accessing of the
pornography in question here?
Universities are widely regarded as being Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). As stated on the University of
Central Arkansas’ Web site, 58 ‘‘since the University of
Central Arkansas provides Internet connections and has
the capability to place materials online to students,
faculty and staff, it is an ISP under the law.’’ Similarly, the
University of Texas states on its Web site 59 that ‘‘a university is an ISP for its own community of students,
faculty and staff’’. According to Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Harvard
University’s in-house counsel, ‘‘Colleges and universities
are just Internet Service Providers that charge tuition’’. 60
Can a University, as an ISP, Fall Under Sections
163 and 163.1, Thereby, in Permitting Student A’s
Conduct to Occur, Violating the Canadian
Criminal Code?
As stated recently in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Doe, 61 ‘‘the
law in Ontario respecting the liability of an Internet
Service Provider for the actions of its customer is not
clear’’. However, the Federal Court of Appeal has recently
attempted to add clarification to the legal status of ISPs
in Canada. Tariff 22, 62 created to deal with the ‘‘Transmission of musical works to subscribers via a telecommunications service . . .’’, was submitted, as required, for
approval to the Copyright Board of Canada by the
Society of Composers, Authors, and Music Publishers of
Canada (SOCAN) in 1995. The Board’s conclusions
regarding the proposed tariff were released on
October 27, 1999. 63 The Federal Court of Appeal’s subsequent decision was released on May 1, 2002. 64 The
matter is now pending before the Supreme Court of
Canada. 65 The question considered by the Federal Court
of Appeal most relevant to this paper was:
When material is transmitted on the Internet, do the operator of the server on which it is stored, and the entity
supplying the ultimate recipient with access to the Internet,
only provide ‘‘the means of telecommunication necessary
for another person to so communicate the work’’ within the
meaning of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) [as enacted by S.C. 1997,
c. 24, s. 2] of the Copyright Act? If they do, then operating a
host server and providing Internet access do not constitute
the communication by telecommunication of transmitted
material and, hence, do not attract liability to pay a royalty. 66

Paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Canadian Copyright Act 67
reads:
A person whose only act in respect of the communications
of a work or other subject-matter to the public consists of
providing the means of telecommunication necessary for
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another person to so communicate the work or other subject-matter does not communicate that work or other subject-matter to the public [. . .].

The Federal Court of Appeal concluded that pursuant to paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Canadian Copyright
Act, an ISP is not liable for infringing copyright by communicating a work to the public by telecommunication
if the ISP’s only act with respect to the communication
was to provide the means of telecommunication necessary for another person to communicate the material to
the public. In other words, such ISPs are mere
intermediaries within the meaning of paragraph 2.4(1)(b)
of the Copyright Act. Therefore, by analogy, it would
seem that a university, in acting as an ISP, would never
be publishing, distributing, circulating, or possessing
within the meaning of the Criminal Code sections 163
and 163.1, as long as it only provided the means necessary for the transmission of the material.
However, the Federal Court of Appeal in the
SOCAN decision went on to conclude that an ISP
would be liable for copyright infringement should it
cache material, thereby falling outside the exception provided in paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, by
providing means of telecommunication that was unnecessary to another person to communicate the work to
the public. As stated in paragraph 135 of the decision,
‘‘the fact that the cache enhances the speed of transmission and reduces the cost to the Internet access provider
does not render the cache a practical necessity for communication.’’ It is further held that the operator of a
cache commits copyright infringement ‘‘. . . because the
cache operator selects which material will be cached, and
programmes the computer to transmit it from the cache
when it is requested. The operator of a cache is thus not
merely a passive transmitter of data.’’ 68 Therefore, should
a university be caching, it would not be protected under
paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act from copyright
liability.
Other than with respect to caching material, there is
no other way, under the SOCAN decision, for an ISP to
be found liable for copyright infringement, even if its
users are infringing. According to the Federal Court of
Appeal, ‘‘operators of host servers and Internet access
providers do not effectively control the content of what
is transmitted, . . . their role is passive and . . . their activities usually consist only of the provision of the means of
telecommunication for the purpose of paragraph 2.4(1)(b). . .’’. 69 The Court further states that unless
an ISP has a contractual relationship with a host server
operator or a content provider, 70 it has no control over
the material posted on its server, 71 and therefore does
not authorize the communication of material that is
infringing. 72 Furthermore, found the Court, it is not practical, economically efficient, or feasible for an ISP to
screen all material being transmitted over its routers to
an end user. 73 Other jurisdictions, including the United
Kingdom, 74 Australia, the European Union, 75 Japan, and
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the United States, 76 have jurisprudence or legislation that
shields ISPs from copyright infringement ‘‘in respect of
material stored on their servers, unless, after receiving
notice of infringing material, the operator fails to take
appropriate action. Failure to remove the material may
expose the host server operator to liability.’’ In Canada,
however, no such jurisprudence or legislation exists yet.
If the Federal Court of Appeal’s reasoning in this regard
is upheld, and unless court decisions or rules such as
those in jurisdictions outside Canada are enacted, ISPs in
Canada will not be found liable for copyright infringement unless they cache the infringing material.
Overall, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded
that:
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Whether conduct amounts to authorization is . . . largely a
factual question and, since the [Copyright] Board did not
misdirect itself in law by adopting an erroneous test, its
conclusion that the normal activities of the operators of host
servers and of Internet access providers do not ‘‘authorize’’
the communication of material to the end user, including
infringing material, can only be set aside on the ground of
unreasonableness. In my opinion, [because] there was sufficient evidence before the Board, it was not unreasonable for
it to conclude that the normal activities of host server operators [and Internet access providers] do not implicitly
authorize content providers to communicate the material
that they have posted on the server.

Using this approach, by analogy to copyright law, a
university would not be liable under the Criminal Code
even if Student A was violating sections 163 or 163.1
because the university would have no relationship with
the pornography sites (content providers) being accessed
by its student, and therefore could not be said to have
authorized the possession or transmission of the material. Nor could it be said to be itself publishing, circulating, distributing, or possessing because it would be
acting merely as the provider of the means of telecommunication. Under the Federal Court of Appeal’s interpretation, the only way a university as an ISP would be
liable under the Criminal Code would be if it cached
material including that which is banned under sections 163 and 163.1. In addition, a Canadian university is
not under a duty to take action against Student A merely
because it is aware of Student A’s activity, as has been
legislated for ISPs in other jurisdictions in certain cases.
Moreover, it is important to note again that the
situation provided in the introduction to this paper
involves the viewing of pornography, rather than explicitly involving the viewing of material that is obscene or
involves child pornography. Should a university be
caching pornography that is neither obscene nor
involving child pornography, neither the university nor
Student A would be in violation of the Criminal Code
because the Code does not deal with the wider class of

pornography — only with the narrower classes of
obscene material and child pornography.
However, if a university is caching material and the
law therefore considers the university to be an active
participant in the transmission of content to its students,
including Student A, then this would further support the
argument, presented more fully later, that the university
may be liable for creating a poisoned environment contrary to human rights legislation.
In summation, any claim that Student A — the
viewer of online pornography in a residence room —
might have against a university, if the university decides
to regulate the student’s online behaviour, would be tenuous at best. A university has statutory authority,
affirmed by the courts, to regulate a student’s academic
and non-academic behaviour. Due to the fact that a
university is not under the purview of the Charter, a
student would not be able to claim a violation of his or
her right to freedom of expression under section 2(b)
should a university decide to regulate his or her online
conduct. With respect to a privacy claim outside the
Charter, a student in residence at the University of
Western Ontario, for example, does not have any contractual right to privacy. It is unlikely that a claim to
privacy based in tort would succeed. Finally, only certain
provinces have privacy statutes to date that offer protection to a student from being monitored in a university
residence. Therefore, any claim a student would have
under privacy legislation would be based on his or her
province of residence.
However, depending on the Supreme Court of
Canada’s interpretation of the SOCAN decision, and its
consequent definition of an ISP and an ISP’s role in the
provisions of information, if a university decides not to
monitor Student A’s behaviour, and Student A deals
with online child pornography or obscene material contrary to the Criminal Code, the university may incur
liability under the Criminal Code. If the Supreme Court
of Canada adopts the distinctions made by the Federal
Court of Canada, this situation would occur only if the
university’s technology worked in such a way that the
university was caching material.
Thus, not only must a university be conscious of its
relationship with Student A — the viewer — it must also
be conscious of its potential responsibilities to the public
for the activities of Student A. As well as its potential
responsibilities to the public, the university in this situation must consider its responsibilities, if any, towards
Student B — the neighbour of Student A — who is
alleging sexual harassment.
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The Relationship Between a
University and Student B
(the Neighbour)
Is a University Obliged to Protect Its
Students From Sexual Harassment?
The Example of the Ontario Human Rights
Code 77

I
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n Ontario, a university does not fall under the purview of the Ontario Human Rights Code, regardless
of whether it has made any statements to the contrary in
its internal university documents, 78 because the Ontario
Human Rights Code only applies to landlord/tenant
relationships. 79 Subsection 7(1) of the Ontario Human
Rights Code states that ‘‘every person who occupies
accommodation has a right to freedom from harassment
because of sex by the landlord or agent of the landlord
or by an occupant of the same building.’’ No definition
of ‘‘accommodation’’ is provided. However, research
demonstrates that there is no contract of tenancy
between a university in Ontario and its students in residence. First, the Ontario Tenant Protection Act 80 states
under paragraph 3(g) that it does not apply
. . . with respect to, living accommodation provided by an
educational institution to its students or staff [where]
(i) the living accommodation is provided primarily
to persons under the age of majority, or all major
questions related to the living accommodation are
decided after consultation with a council or association representing the residents, and
(ii) the living accommodation does not have its own
self-contained bathroom and kitchen facilities or
is not intended for year-round occupancy by fulltime students or staff and members of their
households.

Therefore, according to the Ontario Tenant Protection Act, a university and its students in residence are not
in a tenancy relationship.
Second, case law establishes that the relationship of
a residence student and a university is one created
through a licence, rather than a tenancy lease. 81 In order
to determine whether two parties are in a landlord/tenant or in a licensor/licensee relationship, it is
necessary to decide whether there is a lease or whether
there is a licence between them. This is determined by
examining the possession and control of the property. 82
In order to have a lease, a tenant must have exclusivity
and control over the property. In the case of a residence
student and a university, while there is exclusivity, 83 the
university still maintains control over the residence
room (i.e., it dictates what can and cannot be kept in the
room, hung on the walls, etc.). Therefore, a university
and its students must be characterized as licensor and
licensees, rather than as parties to a relationship of tenancy.
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However, despite the fact that students in residence
are not tenants, and therefore are not strictly protected
under provisions such as subsection 7(1) of the Ontario
Human Rights Code, protection may still be available
under human rights legislation because courts have widened the application of human rights legislation to cover
university students in some circumstances.
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal recently held
in Mpega 84 that universities as creatures legislated by the
provinces have the power to adopt policies dealing with
sexual harassment inflicted on or by students. 85 On the
strength of this authority, Canadian universities, therefore, appear to be able to legally create sexual harassment
policies. However, it was not determined in Mpega what
legal recourse a student would have should his or her
university fail to enact or fail to uphold its policies concerning sexual harassment.
In The University of British Columbia v. Berg, 86 the
Supreme Court of Canada decided that human rights
legislation dealing with discrimination can apply to university students. In this case, the disagreement revolved
around the application of the British Columbia Human
Rights Act 87 to the ‘‘services and facilities’’ of the university. The main issue in Berg, and in several other cases
involving the application of human rights legislation to
universities, has been the interpretation of the wording
of the legislation. Section 3 of the British Columbia
Human Rights Act 88 stated that the services and facilities
covered by the Act are those ‘‘customarily available to
the public.’’ 89 Past case law had decided that a university’s services and facilities were not ‘‘customarily available to the public’’ and therefore were not covered by
human rights legislation. 90 However, Chief Justice Lamer
in Berg, for the majority, held that ‘‘every service has its
own public, and once that ‘public’ has been defined
through the use of eligibility criteria, the Act prohibits
discrimination within that public.’’ 91 In the case of a
university, its students are its ‘‘public’’. So, if human
rights legislation does apply to the particular sphere of
activity of students at university, then a university has the
obligation to protect students in its ‘‘public’’ from discrimination, despite the fact that they are not in the
general public. 92
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada in Berg
concluded that human rights legislation must apply to
university students because no other protection from
discrimination is available to them. Chief Justice Lamer
first reiterated that the Charter does not apply to universities. 93 Secondly, in accordance with the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Seneca College of Applied Arts
and Technology v. Bhadauria, 94 the Supreme Court of
Canada in Berg refused to create a tort of discrimination
because its existence would be redundant — human
rights legislation already exists to protect individuals
from discrimination. In paragraphs 50-51, Lamer C.J.
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stated that without the Charter or a tort of discrimination, ‘‘students enrolled in the university would be
denied any protection from discrimination. This cannot
be maintained . . . such a distinction would allow such
institutions to frustrate the purpose of the legislation . . .’’.
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, it
is necessary for human rights legislation to apply to university students in order to protect them from discrimination because no other protection is available to them
under the law.
Under this authority, it is arguable that all universities in Canada fall under the purview of their provincial
human rights legislation, even with respect to residence
relationships precisely because no other protection has
been available to them under law. However, it is important to realize that while the Supreme Court of Canada
in Berg found that university students must be protected
from discrimination, no mention was made of a requirement to protect students from harassment. This may not
have been due, however, to a belief that students should
not be protected from harassment. Rather, the question
did not arise in the case because the British Columbia
Human Rights Act, involved in the case, did not cover
harassment at all; it only mentioned discrimination. 95
The Ontario Human Rights Code, on the other hand,
includes harassment as a form of discrimination and
therefore, using the reasoning in Berg with respect to
protection from discrimination, a court would probably
extend the protection of the Ontario Code from harassment to encompass students as well. Similarly, although
the Ontario Human Rights Code specifies its application
to accommodation only in a landlord/tenant context,
and the authorities indicate that a university in Ontario
and its residence students are not in that context, it may
well be argued that the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning in Berg should be extended to apply the Ontario
Human Rights Code to the context of residence students’ licence relationships, in addition to tenancy relationships in the general population. If, as stated in Berg,
the services and facilities of a university must comply
with human rights legislation in order to protect students from discrimination, then it may arguably be said
that the accommodation provided by a university under
licence must also comply with human rights legislation
in order to protect students from harassment.
In addition to the arguments presented above that
show that human rights legislation may protect university students, the Ontario Human Rights Commission
(OHRC) 96 itself interprets the definition of ‘‘accommodation’’ under the Ontario Human Rights Code broadly.
Although the interpretation of the Commission may be
found by a Court to be overbroad, paragraph 29(b) of the
Code states that it is the job of the OHRC to ‘‘promote
an understanding and acceptance of and compliance
with the Act.’’ In response to questions posed to the
OHRC regarding the application of the Ontario Human
Rights Code to university residences, 97 the OHRC verified that it interprets the Code as applying to university

residences simply because, in its view, they are a type of
accommodation. In its view, the relationship of
licensor/licensee between a university and its students is
irrelevant. In other words, the OHRC takes an expansive
interpretation of the definition of ‘‘accommodation’’,
from the provision of a living space by a landlord to a
tenant to the provision of a living space in general.
Thus, if the reasoning in Berg is correctly applied to
university students, every university in Canada probably
has a duty under public law to protect its students from
discrimination and harassment as described under its
provincial human rights legislation, despite the fact that
it is not in a tenancy relationship with its students in
residence. 98
Is the Creation of a ‘‘Poisoned Environment’’ an
Act of Sexual Harassment?
Harassment is defined in section 10(1) of the
Ontario Human Rights Code as ‘‘engaging in a course of
vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought
reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.’’ 99 It is questionable whether the viewing of online pornography in a
residence room by Student A fits into this definition
because it is not the behaviour itself that is directly
harmful to Student B. Rather, the viewing could only
possibly fit under the definition of harassment if it can
be said to create an intimidating, demeaning, or hostile
work, study, or living environment — a ‘‘poisoned’’ environment. While nothing is specifically mentioned in the
Ontario Human Rights Code about the creation of a
‘‘poisoned environment’’, in June 1993, 100 the OHRC
published a Policy Statement on Sexual Harassment and
Inappropriate Gender-Related Comment and Conduct 101 to clarify the definition of sexual harassment in
the Code. Specifically, under section 6 of the Policy, the
OHRC explains the concept of a ‘‘poisoned environment’’:
A specific instance of sexual harassment or inappropriate
gender-related comments or conduct might not meet the
literal definition of harassment under the Code. However,
there could be circumstances in which a single incident of
inappropriate behavior may be significant or substantial
enough to constitute a breach of the Code, by creating a
poisoned environment for some individuals because of their
sex. In other words, there could be circumstances in which
unequal treatment does not have to occur continually or
repeatedly for there to be a violation of the Code. 102

According to the Policy, sections 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of
the Code, which provide protection from sexual harassment in general, can be the basis for a claim of sexual
harassment created by a ‘‘poisoned environment’’. The
creation of a poisoned environment is serious enough to
fall under the ambit of sexual harassment because of the
‘‘impact of the comments or conduct on an individual
because of her or his sex.’’ The Policy also states that the
number of times the behavior occurs, or the number of
people the behavior hurts or is aimed at, does not matter.
A victim of a poisoned environment does not have to
have been the target of the behaviour. In addition,
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‘‘intent is not a prerequisite to establishing that treatment is discriminatory. Rather, the Commission, as
stated in its Policy, looks to the effect or result of the
comments or actions on the recipient.’’ 103 So, a poisoned
environment can be created by someone who is unintentionally behaving in a manner that indirectly impacts
another negatively.
The OHRC has also created a Guide to the Human
Rights Code 104 that provides a further explanation of a
‘‘poisoned environment’’:
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You might feel that your housing is hostile or unwelcoming
to you because of insulting or degrading comments or
actions that have been made about others based on a
ground in the Code. When comments or conduct of this
kind have an influence on others and how they are treated,
this is known as a ‘‘poisoned environment’’. A poisoned
environment cannot, however, be based only on your personal views. You must have facts to show that most people
would see the comments or conduct resulting in unequal or
unfair terms and conditions.

Although the addition of the term ‘‘poisoned environment’’ to the Code’s definition of sexual harassment
is purely an interpretation of the OHRC’s own making,
and has only recently been acknowledged by the
courts, 105 the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly
stated that a broad, liberal and purposive approach must
be applied to human rights legislation. 106 For example, in
Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears
Ltd., 107 Justice McIntyre observed that ‘‘legislation of this
type is of a special nature, not quite constitutional but
certainly more than the ordinary — and it is for the
courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.’’ 108 Similarly, in Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), 109 Justice
LaForest held that human rights legislation ‘‘must be so
interpreted as to advance the broad policy considerations
underlying it.’’ Because prohibition against the creation
of a poisoned environment is based on the legislated
human rights provisions against harassment and discrimination, it may not be too far an extension for a court to
‘‘read in’’ the term ‘‘poisoned environment’’ under the
Code’s examples of sexual harassment. In fact, a number
of decisions in the employment context deal with the
creation of a poisoned environment. 110 In O.H.R.C. and
Matsuinch Abdolalipour and Raed Murad v. Allied
Chemical Canada Ltd., 111 where the creation of a
poisoned environment was considered in the specific
context of sexual harassment, the Board of Inquiry held
that ‘‘the display or tolerance of pornography in the
workplace is a likely indication of a male dominated
culture where it is acceptable to view women as primarily sexualized beings. . . . Ms. Abdolalipour experienced a
poisoned work environment.’’
Overall, because a university in Canada may well be
obliged under human rights legislation to protect its
students from sexual harassment, it may also be obliged
to shield its students from a poisoned environment,
although this latter obligation is a relatively unexplored
concept in this context. 112
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Does the Viewing of Pornography By a Student in
a Residence Room Create a Poisoned
Environment?
Even if the concept of creating a poisoned environment is viable under Canadian law in connection with
university residence life, does the viewing of online pornography by Student A, in his or her own residence
room, create such an environment?
In Ontario, if the viewing of pornography by one
person is known to others, and is creating an environment that would reasonably be classified as being
uncomfortable for others, it seems that it may fall within
the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s own definition of an act that creates a poisoned environment (see
above).
Decisions in the context of employment scenarios
have demonstrated that the viewing of pornography at
work during working hours in a private office may be
capable of leading to termination as punishment for the
disruption it causes to other workers. For example, in
London (City) and C.U.P.E. 101 (D.(M.)) (Re), 113 the arbitrator held that although the employer in this case
should not have fired the employee for viewing pornography on work computers during work time, this was
because of his mental disability (obsessive-compulsive
disorder). According to the arbitrator, the employer
should have just ordered a suspension from work. However, the arbitrator did acknowledge the employer’s argument that:
. . . the grievor’s extensive use of the Internet for non workrelated purposes adversely affected Ontario Works clients
through inattention to them, and the sort of material he
was viewing was such that his co-workers, in the close environment of the workplace, ought not to have to be put in
the position of learning to live with the sorts of sites he was
viewing. 114

The arbitrator held that ‘‘the Employer had proper
cause to discipline the grievor on the grounds of its
policy prohibition against employees viewing pornography in the workplace as an inappropriate use of the
Internet and which policy was not challenged as being
unreasonable.’’ 115 Part of the policy that the arbitrator
upheld prohibited the viewing of pornography because
of the potential negative effect it could have had on
fellow employees, regardless of whether they saw the
pornography or not. Indeed, the testimony of a coworker, L.K., emphasized the point that even though she
had only viewed the pornography once, the knowledge
of its existence in the grievor’s office was enough to
disrupt her working environment.
Similarly, in Greater Toronto Airports Authority
and P.S.A.C. (Gorski) (Re), 116 the arbitrator held that a
poisoned environment was created by the grievor’s
viewing of pornography on the work computer because
one co-worker had observed the behavior one time.
According to the arbitrator, ‘‘The employer’s obligations
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under law are clear in this area: it must enforce a prohibition against the display of sexually explicit photo
images and strive to maintain a non-toxic work environment.’’ 117
By analogy to the reasoning of these arbitrators in
employment grievance decisions, it may be argued that
the viewing of pornography by Student A in his or her
own residence room could reasonably cause Student B
harm by disrupting his or her work, study, or living
environment. The viewing might be considered to be
behaviour creating a poisoned environment, and therefore Student A’s act might be interpreted to fall under
the ambit of the Ontario Human Rights Code, and the
university may therefore be responsible for eradicating
such behaviour.
It is important to recall, however, that should Student A be found to have created a poisoned environment, and therefore Student B be found to have a claim
of sexual harassment under the Ontario Human Rights
Code, the victimized student, Student B, would not be
able to take court action directly against Student A or
against his or her university for failing to protect him or
her. Rather, to pursue such a charge, Student B would
have to go through the Ontario Human Rights Commission to launch a complaint against the university. 118
Thus, it is possible that a Canadian university may
fall afoul of human rights legislation for permitting the
creation of a poisoned environment if Student B lays a
complaint based on the conduct of Student A in viewing
pornography in the residence. There is jurisprudence to
the effect that a university must protect its students in
accordance with human rights legislation. The extension
of human rights legislation to a prohibition of a
poisoned environment, however, could go beyond current jurisprudence.
If Student B cannot get satisfaction through a complaint under human rights legislation, can Student B
successfully sue the university in tort for failing to control Student A’s behaviour?

Legal Obligations Upon a University
Under Tort Law
Case law has shown that a university can be found
liable if it does not uphold its general responsibility to
protect students from certain hazards. For example, in
Boudreau v. Lin, 119 an Ontario Court (General Division)
judge stated that a university is obliged in certain circumstances to protect its students from copyright
infringement. Boudreau was a part-time student in the
University of Ottawa’s MBA program. He submitted a
paper to Professor Lin, who then presented the paper,
with another professor, as his own. The paper was subsequently copied and sold to MBA students as a case note
without crediting Boudreau, and showing Lin as an
author. Lin also used the paper to support his application
to the university for a promotion and claimed that he
was its principal researcher. Boudreau complained to the

university about Lin’s behaviour. The university, through
the Dean of the Faculty of Business Administration,
accepted Professor Lin’s apology and cautioned him to
be more prudent in the future. However, the university
did not sanction him for his conduct, stop the infringement, or compensate Boudreau, the student. Speaking
for the Ontario Court (General Division), Justice
Metivier stated that:
. . . the University cannot stand idly by while its professors
blatantly breach copyright laws. At the very least, the University is a passive participant. As employer of the professor
— it is the duty of the University to set policies for the
conduct of its employees and to accept responsibility for
monitoring, or failing to monitor, the strict observation of
these policies and, in this case, of copyright laws. If the
University had no direct knowledge, they are deemed to
have had it, or they should have had it . . . The University is
the organization which offers courses, which awards marks
in these courses, and to which the student pays tuition for
these courses . . . It is clear that the University owes a duty to
the student to oversee and regulate the acts done by Professor Lin in the course of his employment. 120

However, the duty of protection in this case related
specifically to statutory copyright infringement. In asking
whether a university may be liable for a tort directly
related to a residence student’s behaviour concerning
online pornography, there are three torts that must be
explored: the tort of statutory breach, the tort of general
negligence, and the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
The Tort of Statutory Breach
The tort of statutory breach imposes liability on any
party that negligently fails to abide by the standard of
care set by a statute. Prior to 1983, Canadian tort law had
mixed views concerning the tort of statutory breach.
However, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v. Canada 121 brought
clarity to the definition and position of this tort in
Canadian law. First, according to the Supreme Court of
Canada, there is no tort of breach of statutory duty in
Canada. Contrary to the view of most American courts,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that a breach of the
standard set by a statute is not negligence per se. However, if the statute at issue (i.e., the Criminal Code) has
created a recognized common law duty of care, then
breach of the statutory duty would be relevant to the
claim of negligence. In these situations, the ultimate issue
would be whether or not the defendant failed to act
with reasonable care. Liability would depend on fault
and the application of negligence principles.
As stated earlier, sections 163 and 163.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code create a duty to not commit any of
the enumerated actions with obscene material or child
pornography found therein, and this duty is placed on
every member of Canadian society. As discussed, the
only way a university would have any role in the possession or distribution of obscenity or child pornography in
this scenario would be in its role as an ISP. As already
concluded, absent further legislation and assuming the
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Supreme Court of Canada upholds the Federal Court of
Appeal’s decision on this point in SOCAN, an ISP is only
possibly linked to the material on its server in this context if it is caching it. Therefore, a university could only
be liable for a breach of its duty under the Criminal
Code if it had a role in caching content that included
obscenity or child pornography. If the university can be
said to have breached its duty under the Criminal Code,
this breach can then be used by the plaintiff to support a
claim of general negligence or negligent misrepresentation, as discussed below, although in and of itself, such a
breach is not actionable in a civil law suit, as discussed
above.

Examples of questions to ask in order to make this
determination are ‘‘Would the new duty create indeterminate liability?’’; ‘‘Have public and private interests
been balanced?’’; and ‘‘Would it involve great cost to the
taxpaying public?’’ 125

The Tort of General Negligence

Second, by stipulating that a university has a duty to
protect students from sexual harassment, for example,
public and private interests would be balanced. The university would not be liable for every harm inflicted on its
students, and the students would be protected against
harm that has been statutorily recognized in human
rights legislation.

For any claim under the tort of negligence to succeed, it is necessary to demonstrate five elements: a duty
of care, a failure to live up to a standard of care, causation, remoteness, and damages.
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In order to establish the existence of a duty between
parties, the test laid out in Cooper v. Hobart 122 must be
fulfilled. First, it must be established that the circumstances disclose reasonably foreseeable harm to the plaintiff and proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie
duty of care. It is necessary to look at whether the parties
fall into a category of relationships in which a duty of
care has been recognized, or if this is a situation in
which, because of proximity and policy reasons, a new
duty of care should be reasonably recognized.
Secondly, it is necessary to look at whether there are
residual policy concerns, apart from those considered in
determining a relationship of proximity, which would
negate a prima facie duty of care.
Is the situation described within or analogous to a
category of cases in which a duty of care has previously
been recognized?
Several cases have been decided in Canada in which
the Board of Governors of a university has been found
liable for not protecting a student from harm. 123 Thus, a
duty of care has previously been placed upon a university and its governing bodies by Canadian courts. However, in the alternative, should these cases not establish a
duty of care, it can be argued that the relationship
between a university and its students raises policy issues
that would support the creation of a new duty of care.
The proximity between the two parties — due to the
quasi-fiduciary relationship of trust and the inequality of
power — suggests that a university should have the
responsibility to oversee the well-being of its students. 124
If there is a duty between the two parties, are there
any residual policy considerations, apart from those considered in determining a relationship of proximity, that
would negate a prima facie duty of care?

First, in order to avoid the creation of indeterminate
liability, it would be necessary to specify the duty (i.e., the
duty to protect students from sexual harassment, rather
than the duty to protect the general health, safety, and
well-being of students). Without specification, a university could be indeterminately liable for any sort of harm
done to a student (i.e., the mental anguish caused by a
bad relationship with another student while living in
residence).

Last, because universities are theoretically private
and not public entities, it might be argued that it would
not cost the taxpayers additional money to hold universities liable under this new duty. 126
As stated previously, Canadian courts have imposed
a duty of care on a university, through its Board of
Governors, in respect to its relationships with its students. However, should a duty of care need to be reestablished, although policy reasons supporting the creation of a duty between a university and its students are
tenuous, there are no policy reasons against imposing a
duty of care upon a university with respect to safeguarding its students from sexual harassment. Therefore,
should a duty between a university and its students exist
or be created, it would then be necessary to establish
whether the failure of a university to protect its students
from sexual harassment in the circumstances described
herein is contrary to the standard of care it is obliged to
maintain.

Standard of Care
The law requires each person to act as a reasonable
and prudent person would in the same circumstances. 127
Factors to consider in order to find a breach of the
standard of care are the probability and severity of
harm 128 and the cost of risk avoidance. 129
First, though, before assessing harm and risk avoidance, it is important to determine how a university could
protect a student from sexual harassment caused by the
creation of a poisoned environment through the viewing
of pornography, as discussed here. Potential methods of
protection would be the monitoring of students’ activities, blocking access to particular types of Web sites or
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disabling the ability to use file-sharing programs for certain materials, or creating reactive measures (i.e., a ‘‘tattletale’’ system in residence and subsequent punishment)
that would aim to deter this behaviour by Student A. At
this moment, universities have already given themselves
permission to assume the passive and reactive role of
acting once the notice of this conduct has been given. 130
Thus, universities have the capacity to avoid the harm
involved here. The cost, of course, would be to the free
flow of information in the university environment.
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What, then, would a ‘‘reasonable’’ university do to
protect its students from a poisoned environment? A
very useful factor in determining whether a party’s conduct is reasonable or not is to examine the general practice of those engaged in a similar activity. Every university in Canada has the same lack of a hands-on approach
to monitoring students’ activities in residence. In addition, proactive measures such as surveillance are probably not economically viable and may violate the student’s privacy rights (as discussed above). So, only
reactive measures such as reacting to complaints or
deterrent measures such as blocking online pornography
sites would be reasonable, despite the fact that these
measures do not always protect students from the harm
under discussion.
It may be argued therefore that Canadian universities are already acting as any reasonable university would
to protect its students from sexual harassment caused by
the creation of a poisoned environment, and it would
not be economically efficient for universities to implement further risk-avoidance measures. The probability
and severity of harm caused by the creation of a
poisoned environment could be argued to be minimal,
as demonstrated by the lack of direct protection against
poisoned environments under Canadian human rights
legislation, and therefore does not warrant an increase of
economic cost imposed upon the universities.
Under this argument, universities can reasonably do
no more to protect their students than what they are
already doing and therefore, any harm caused to a student from a poisoned environment cannot be due to a
university’s failure to fulfill its duty and standard of care.
If this argument is persuasive, should a residence student
such as Student B seek redress for damage incurred from
the creation of a poisoned environment, he or she would
not be able to claim compensation from his or her university under the tort of general negligence.
The Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation
Should a victimized student such as Student B state
that a university had promised to protect him or her
from a poisoned environment and had subsequently
failed to do so, and that pure economic loss resulted
from this failure, would he or she have a claim against
the university for negligent misrepresentation? Once
again, the University of Western Ontario and its internal

documents will be used as a case example; the analysis,
however, is applicable to any university.
Historically, a defendant would not be found liable
for negligent misrepresentation unless the parties were in
a fiduciary relationship or the misrepresentation was
fraudulent. However, in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd., 131 the House of Lords held that in
certain circumstances, when the parties are in a ‘‘special
relationship’’, a duty of care may arise in providing
‘‘information, opinion, or advice.’’ 132 To have a special
relationship, it was necessary under Hedley Byrne to
meet the following factors: (1) a voluntary assumption of
responsibility for the information, opinion, or advice,
(2) foreseeable and detrimental reliance, and (3) reasonable reliance. If all three elements were met, then it was
possible for one of the parties to be found liable for
negligent misrepresentation.
Queen v. Cognos Inc. 133 brought the concept of
negligent misrepresentation into the Canadian courts.
Justice Iacobbuci, for the majority, held that the liability
under Hedley Byrne is not limited to professionals or to
those who are in the business of giving advice, and that
the new test for negligent misrepresentation involves five
general requirements: (1) there must be a duty of care
based on a ‘‘ special relationship ’’ between the
representor and the representee; (2) the representation in
question must be untrue, inaccurate, or misleading;
(3) the representor must have acted negligently in
making said misrepresentation; (4) the representee must
have relied, in a reasonable manner, on said negligent
misrepresentation; and (5) the reliance must have been
detrimental to the representee in the sense that damages
resulted.

There must be a duty of care based on a ‘‘special
relationship’’ between the representor and the
representee. 134
The Supreme Court of Canada in Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst & Young 135 clarified this duty by
stating that in order to have a special relationship and
find a prima facie duty of care, the plaintiff must establish that the representor ‘‘ought reasonably to have foreseen that the plaintiff would rely on his representation
and that reliance by the plaintiff, in the circumstances,
would be reasonable.’’ 136

Foreseeable Reliance/Reasonable Reliance
Certain factors should be examined in order to conclude whether a situation of foreseeable and reasonable
reliance existed: the expertise and knowledge of the
defendant, the seriousness of the occasion, the initial
request for information by the plaintiff, the pecuniary
interest of the defendant, the nature of the statement on
which the plaintiff relied, and the existence of disclaimers. 137
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The Expertise and Knowledge of the Defendant — The
expertise and knowledge of a university regarding the
environment that it strives to create can be argued to be
evident in its policy documents and its brochures. For
example, the University of Western Ontario Health and
Safety Policy 138 states that the university has ‘‘an ethical
as well as a legal responsibility to provide a safe environment in which to study and to work.’’ Staff and faculty
are responsible for complying with the safety requirements and standards set out under this Health and
Safety Policy. The Residents’ Handbook 139 maintains
that it is the purpose of the Residents’ Handbook ‘‘to
provide for the safety of persons and property, and to
maintain an atmosphere conducive to community living
in an academic environment.’’ 140 It would be reasonable
for a student to conclude that if the purpose of the
Residents’ Handbook is to maintain a certain environment, then it is also the purpose of the university, which
created the Residents’ Handbook, to maintain a certain
environment.
In addition, publications created by University of
Western Ontario employees also seem designed to educate and inform the university community about creating a certain environment at the university. The University of Western Ontario’s Students’ Services Statement
on Human Rights, 141 for example, was created by the
University of Western Ontario’s Equity Services department, in conjunction with the Student Development
Centre, to affirm the University of Western Ontario’s
‘‘wish to ensure the full and fair implementation of the
principles of the Ontario Human Rights Code.’’ 142 The
UWO Equity Services Info Sheet — Harassment and
Discrimination 143 also appears to be stating a belief of
the university’s community that ‘‘every member of the
University community has the right to study and work
in an environment free of discrimination and harassment.’’ 144 The university community therefore may be
argued to be educated and knowledgeable about creating conditions that would avoid the creation of a
poisoned environment and avoid acts of sexual harassment that would have the potential to violate a student’s
perceptions of safety.

The Seriousness of the Occasion — Reliance on information given is increasingly considered foreseeable and reasonable when the circumstances surrounding the giving
of the information are more formal. 145 For example, at
the University of Western Ontario, the Residents’ Handbook is given to potential students of the University of
Western Ontario as well as to those who have accepted a
place at the university. Other university documents mentioned above that deal with safety issues are not provided
to students or applicants, but are publicly accessible
online. Still others are only accessible in paper format
from various university departments but are available to
any member of the public at those locations. Although
the information is not presented for a particular reason,
it does bear the formal imprint of the university.
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The Initial Request for Information by the Plaintiff — As
discussed, for the most part, the plaintiff, Student B,
would not have requested the information provided by
the university’s documents. Rather, as discussed, at the
University of Western Ontario, the Residents’ Handbook
and Understandings is provided by the university to a
potential student within a package of complete information on the university. While the other university documents must be located personally by the student, the
information is not provided at the student’s request, but
rather is already available for the general public’s perusal.
The Pecuniary Interest of the Defendant — While the
University of Western Ontario, as an example, receives
no direct financial gain for its provision of information, it
can be argued that any future indirect pecuniary benefit
received by the university should have a bearing on
whether a duty exists. The university has the potential to
receive a financial benefit if a potential student relies on
the information provided in its documents, believes that
the university is safe and free from sexual harassment or
any poisoned environment, and decides to attend the
university. Tuition and other ancillary fees are
mandatory upon acceptance of a place at the university.
Student B in this scenario, as a plaintiff, would necessarily be a student at the university and therefore would
have provided the university with a financial benefit.
The Nature of the Statement on Which the Plaintiff
Relied — The tort of negligent misrepresentation relates
to the provision of ‘‘information, opinion, or advice.’’ It
can be argued that the University of Western Ontario in
this scenario is not providing ‘‘information, opinion, or
advice.’’ Rather, through its internal documents, as
demonstrated above, the university expresses its wishes,
beliefs, and intentions regarding sexual harassment, but
does not directly inform students that it will ensure a
harassment-free or poison-free environment. At most, it
might be argued, the university makes quasi-promises to
its students to protect them from sexual harassment. 146
The Existence of Disclaimers — Using the example of
the University of Western Ontario, few internal university documents provide a disclaimer that each student is
responsible for his or her own protection. For example,
the Code of Student Conduct states specifically that ‘‘the
University does not stand in loco parentis to its student
members.’’ 147
Overall, despite the expertise and knowledge of the
University of Western Ontario regarding safety, the
danger of sexual harassment, and the need to avoid a
poisoned environment, and despite the fact that the university indirectly receives a financial benefit from the
potential student when that student enrolls, possibly as a
result of reading the information provided by the university, the fact that there is a lack of formality surrounding
the delivery of the information, the fact that in this scenario the plaintiff Student B did not request the information, and the fact that it is questionable whether the
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university even provides ‘‘information, opinion, or
advice’’ in this area, a student such as Student B would
have a very difficult task of satisfying this first part of the
duty of care test when seeking to establish any tort liability against the university for behaviour such as that
involved in this scenario.
Policy Concerns: Indeterminacy — Should a prima facie
duty of care be found in certain circumstances, it can be
negated based on public policy consideration where a
problem of indeterminacy arises. 148 The ‘‘special relationship’’ necessarily requires some degree of proximity so as
to avoid liability to an indeterminate audience. 149 In
Hercules, for example, the information was initially prepared for a client under contract but was subsequently
circulated to a broad range of non-privy third parties
who used it for a variety of purposes. It is necessary,
therefore, to ask in establishing tort liability whether the
defendant had knowledge of the identity of the plaintiff
or class of plaintiffs, and whether the information was
used in the precise situation for which it was prepared. If
the answer to both questions is affirmative, then the
liability cannot be indeterminate.
For the most part, university documents like the
University of Western Ontario’s documents described
above regarding safety are accessible to the general
public in both electronic and paper format. In addition,
universities often send documents like the University of
Western Ontario Residents’ Handbook 150 in paper
format to many potential students. However, while
potential students may read this type of information
provided by universities, it is only those who have read
the information, accepted the offers of education and
residence, and subsequently been sexually harassed
while living in residence that can potentially fall into the
category of plaintiffs. Therefore, since a university has
knowledge of the identity of its students living in residence, it has knowledge of the identity of any potential
plaintiff or class of plaintiffs in this situation. In addition,
the information provided in these types of university
documents regarding safety can be said to have been
created precisely for the purpose of reassuring potential
and actual students as to their well-being during their
time spent at a particular university and in its residences.
A student’s reading of the documents to determine a
university’s environment is the precise situation for
which the documents were prepared. As a result of a
university’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s identity, and the
fact that the information was used in the precise situation for which it was prepared, there appears to be no
problem of indeterminacy with respect to this type of
action.

The Representation in Question Must Be Untrue,
Inaccurate, or Misleading
If a university represents that it will create and
maintain a certain environment in order to protect its
students in residence, and then fails to do so, its represen-

tation will have ultimately been untrue, inaccurate, and
misleading. However, as mentioned earlier, the University of Western Ontario, for example, does not actually
state that it provides, or will provide, a safe environment.
It states that it wishes to do so and will strive to achieve
this goal. And in fact, the university does have several
measures in place to decrease the possibilities for the
creation or maintenance of a poisoned environment in
residence, such as the provision and enforcement of the
Regulations as laid out in the Residents’ Handbook. In
addition, by setting up a complaint-based system that is
intended to give Residence and Information Technology
Services staff the authority to investigate complaints and
reprimand accordingly, the university is attempting to
maintain a protective environment, albeit not one with
complete barriers from harm.

The Representor Must Have Acted Negligently in
Making the Said Misrepresentation
If a university does not intend to create and maintain a protective environment, then its act of establishing
university policy documents and publications that state
otherwise could be seen as negligent. However, as mentioned above, the University of Western Ontario, for
example, does not state that it has, or will have, a protective environment and would probably not be seen to
have been negligent in making the statements that it has
made (described above).
The Representee Must Have Relied, in a Reasonable
Manner, On Said Negligent Misrepresentation
In addition to establishing a duty of care, the plaintiff Student B would also have to demonstrate causation
— that he or she relied on the misrepresentation that
subsequently caused the harm. In order to demonstrate
reliance, the plaintiff Student B would have to show that
he or she would have acted differently had he or she not
relied on the university’s documents. The only way a
student would be able to satisfy this burden of proof —
that he or she relied on the statements of protection
made by the university — would be to prove that, had
the university not made the statements, he or she would
not have entered residence, or would have entered residence but taken more precautions to protect himself or
herself from sexual harassment. 151
The Reliance Must Have Been Detrimental to the
Representee in the Sense That Damages Resulted
The duty of care in the tort of negligent misrepresentation is considered in relationship to the plaintiff’s
economic interests. In order to satisfy a claim of negligent misrepresentation, pure economic loss must have
resulted from the misrepresentation. Pure economic loss
differs from regular damages in other tort claims in that
the loss does not result from damage to person or property. Rather, pure economic loss cases deal with plaintiffs
whose loss was solely economic or financial. In the case
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safety, rights or property of the University or its members or
visitors.

of a student in residence who had been victimized
through the creation of a poisoned environment, such as
Student B here, it seems most probable that the type of
harm received would be psychological rather than financial. 152
Overall, it seems that the University of Western
Ontario, as an example, would probably not be found
liable under the tort of negligent misrepresentation if a
student like Student B had been sexually harassed from
the creation of a poisoned environment through the
actions of Student A and was seeking redress from the
university. The analysis set out above based upon the
example of the University of Western Ontario can of
course be replicated in the particular circumstances of
any other university and its internal documents. It seems
probable, however, that no Canadian university would
be found liable in tort to Student B in the circumstances
of this problem. However, is it possible that a university
may be liable under the terms of its contracts with its
residence students?

In return for receiving a student’s tuition fee, a university contracts to provide education to the student.
The extent of this obligation is being clarified through
litigation. Cases involving students suing post-secondary
institutions for various infractions 156 are increasing both
nationally and internationally. 157 However, most claims
against universities have been unsuccessful. 158 As stated
previously, courts have generally been wary of interfering
with a university’s jurisdiction over the control of academics in relation to its students. 159

Contractual Obligations on a University
and its Residence Students

The Computing Resources Contract

There are three typical contracts (relevant to this
paper) that exist between a university and its students in
residence: the tuition contract, the use of computing
resources contract, and the residence contract. Each contract can give rise to liability for breach of contract. In
order to determine what exactly constitutes a breach of
contract between a university and its students, it is necessary to define the obligations existing under each contract. Once again, the University of Western Ontario will
serve as a case example; of course, again, the analysis used
will be applicable to any university. Internal U.W.O. university documents may clarify the University’s obligations by defining acceptable student behaviour in the
University residences.
The Tuition Contract
The tuition contract is of general application to
every student at any university and must be renewed
each year. According to Sutcliffe v. Governors of Acadia
University, 153 once a student registers with a university
through a tuition contract, he or she has agreed to be
bound by the provisions of the university, and the university and the student are in a contractual relationship.
According to the University of Western Ontario’s Code
of Student Conduct, mentioned above, upon registration
a student assumes responsibilities that must be fulfilled
in order to continually receive ‘‘academic and social privileges.’’ Additionally, the Code of Student Conduct dictates in its introduction that:
All members of the University community are responsible
for ensuring that their conduct does not jeopardize the good
order and proper functioning of the academic and nonacademic programs and activities of the University or its
faculties, schools or departments, nor endanger the health,

Lastly, the Code of Student Conduct states specifically that ‘‘the University does not stand in loco parentis
to its student members’’, 154 and therefore the students
are free to act as they please until they fail to comply
with a university regulation. These responsibilities under
the Code of Student Conduct incorporate by reference
the duties stipulated under the Sexual Harassment Policy
and Procedures, discussed above, as well. 155

Another typical contract is the contract for use of
computing resources. Students in residence at the University of Western Ontario, for example, have several
options regarding obtaining Internet access. With the
provision of the tuition fee, they can use the general
computing resources that are provided by the University
of Western Ontario and are available at various locations
on-campus (but not in residence). The problem being
considered here does not concern this mode of access. In
residence, at the University of Western Ontario, students
can access the Internet in two ways: 160 through an independent Internet Service Provider of their choice, 161 or
through RezNet. RezNet is U.W.O.’s Residence Network, extending campus-wide network connectivity and
Internet access to students in residence. Through
RezNet, students can exchange e-mail, browse and publish information on the World Wide Web, and have easy
access to course material and the U.W.O. Library
System. 162 The use of RezNet is the most popular option
chosen by residence students due to its convenience and
economic feasibility. 163
The use of RezNet involves the provision of a fee
from the student to the university and the agreement of
the student to abide by the Acceptable Use Agreement:
University’s Code of Behavior for Use of Computing
Resources and Corporate Data. 164 This Acceptable Use
Agreement applies to ‘‘all users of the university’s computing resources’’, 165 and dictates what acts are acceptable and which shall be subject to disciplinary procedures by the Information and Technology Services
Department of the university. The Acceptable Use Agreement, which appears online when a residence student is
setting up a RezNet account, 166 states that ‘‘no user
account is enabled until the user agrees to this Code of
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Behaviour.’’ Under the Acceptable Use Agreement, subscribers agree to use the university’s computing resources
in an ‘‘effective, ethical and lawful manner . . . [and to]
conduct themselves according to the high standards of
professional ethics and behavior appropriate in an institution of higher learning.’’ In return, a user receives
access to the Internet and to the university’s computing
resources. In addition, the RezNet Hotline is available for
technical support, as are RezNet Consultants and the
Information Technology Services Help Desk.
The Residence Hall Network Connection Guidelines, 167 which have not been approved by the Board of
Governors nor by the Senate, and therefore are not
legally binding on ITS users, 168 were created to assist in
the interpretation of the Acceptable Use Agreement.
Under Section III: Responsibilities of the Connection
Guidelines, it is stated that ‘‘using University resources to
solicit or harass another individual is forbidden.’’ Examples of harassing behaviour that are set out in the Acceptable Use Agreement include sending unsolicited e-mail
and harassing and obscene messages that contravene the
Sexual Harassment Policy. 169 The Connection Guidelines also state under Section III: Responsibilities that it is
not necessary for a student to have subjective knowledge
of the offensiveness of his or her behaviour in order to be
found liable for the misuse of the university’s computing
resources. Rather, ‘‘users are responsible for all traffic
originating from their machine, including user activity,
regardless of: (a) whether or not they generate it,
(b) whether or not they know what they are doing, or
(c) whether or not they realize that they have violated
any specific policies.’’
Section VI of the Guidelines further explains that
any infractions of the Agreement that involve e-mail are
required to be directed to a certain e-mail address, while
all other infractions are directed to another. Alternately,
infractions can also be reported to Residence Managers
or to the University’s Equity Services. According to Section 8.00 of the Agreement, it is the responsibility of the
Senior Director of ITS, an academic official, or the Head
of a local computing facility to deal with any allegation
of misconduct involving a breach of the Agreement. 170
For its part, the University of Western Ontario,
through the Acceptance Use Agreement, contracts to
provide its students with access to the Internet and to
other technological resources. Student B, therefore,
would not be able to sue the university on any grounds
involving this contract.
The only other contractual obligation imposed on
the university in relation to its computing resources is
the obligation it has under its software licensing agreements. Section 5(i ) of the Acceptable Use Agreement
states that ‘‘breaching the terms and conditions of a
software licensing agreement to which the University is a
party’’ is an unauthorized use of the computing
resources of the university. If a student such as Student A
does anything that violates the conditions of such a

software licence, the university might have a remedy
under the Acceptable Use Agreement against the student.
However, this may be problematic because it is not
possible for a student to access these agreements and
therefore, due to lack of notice, this provision is probably
unenforceable. The Acceptable Use Agreement states
that it ‘‘applies to all users of the University’s computing
resources.’’ Under it, users have the responsibility of
ensuring that they use the resources ‘‘in an effective,
ethical and lawful manner . . . according to the high standards of professional ethics and behaviour appropriate in
an institution of higher learning.’’ Moreover, under the
Acceptable Use Agreement, it is stated that ‘‘the intentional use of the computing resources for any purpose
other than academic, administrative, and/or incidental,
non-commercial personal use, will be considered to be
unauthorized.’’ However, while the university might
have a remedy against Student A under the Acceptable
Use Agreement, this would not provide a defence for the
university against either the software licensor 171 or Student B, on these grounds.
So, it would seem that in relation to contracts for
computing resources, the University of Western Ontario,
for example, effectively limits its contractual obligations
towards its students to the provision of service and also
uses the Acceptable Use Agreement to require that students take responsibility for their conduct.
The Residence Contract
After accepting an offer of education from a university, a student can typically apply for a spot in one of the
on-campus residences. At the University of Western
Ontario, the student applies to the University’s Division
of Housing and Ancillary Services. 172 In order to ensure
that the student’s space in residence is reserved, the University of Western Ontario, for example, requires that the
official Residence Contract attached to the Residence
Fee Invoice be signed and returned to the Residence
Admissions Office prior to moving in. At the bottom of
the Residence Contract is the statement: ‘‘I understand
that my residence accommodation is contingent upon
my acceptance of all University regulations, fee regulations and conditions as outlined in the 2002-03
Residents’ Handbook and Understandings 173 and on this
contract/invoice, all of which are accepted accordingly.’’
By signing the residence contract and paying the accommodation fee, the student therefore agrees to abide by all
of the regulations and university policies laid out in the
Residents’ Handbook, discussed above. 174
The purpose of the Residents’ Handbook is ‘‘to provide for the safety of persons and property, and to maintain an atmosphere conducive to community living in
an academic environment.’’ 175 It states that various sanctions will be imposed following a breach of the
Residents’ Handbook, including the possibility of the
termination of the residence contract. As stated on
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page 52, ‘‘The University reserves the right to terminate
the Residence Contract, reassign residences or rooms,
and to effect other steps for the safety, security, and
conduct of the residence program.’’ According to the
Residents’ Handbook, any behaviour that ‘‘erodes the
spirit of diversity within the residence community will
not be tolerated.’’ 176 Specifically, having pornographic
materials in residence that may be offensive to others is
stated to be a contravention of the Residents’ Handbook. 177 In accordance with Morgan, 178 which held that
a student must abide by university regulations regarding
alcohol, it can be argued by analogy that Student A here
would be obliged to uphold university rules such as
these in relation to pornography and, again, could be
sanctioned by the university.
For its part, with the acceptance of the Residence
Contract, the university simply contracts to provide residence accommodation. The Residents’ Handbook
makes no mention of any other obligation (such as a
promise to protect its students in any way) which could
be imposed upon the university by its residence students
as a result of this contractual relationship with the university. In fact, the university deliberately attempts to
limit its liability. As mentioned earlier, the university
states in its Code of Student Conduct, which is incorporated by reference into the Residence Contract, that it is
not in a position of being in loco parentis with its students. 179 In the Residents’ Handbook, which is also
incorporated into this contract for residence by reference, the university states in two places that a student is
individually responsible for ‘‘what takes place in [his or
her] room’’. 180 Again, the University of Western Ontario
would not be able to be held contractually liable to
Student B in this scenario under the provisions of the
residence contract.
Thus, the University of Western Ontario, through
the wording of its three contracts with students for tuition, computing resources, and residence, appears to
have distanced itself from any contractual responsibility
towards any of its students beyond the provision of education, technological resources and support, and accommodation.

Conclusion

A

s stated in the introduction to this paper, the analysis demonstrated in this paper is appropriate to any
university’s legal relationship between itself and its students with regard to its students’ Internet use in residence. Although this paper’s conclusions in certain parts
are specifically limited to the University of Western
Ontario, or to any university in Ontario, firm conclusions about the liability of any other Canadian university
may be reached using the same approach of interpreting
and applying all internal and external primary sources
connected to that university.
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The first question examined in this paper was about
the nature of the relationship between a university and
Student A — the student viewer of online pornography
in a university residence room. Through an interpretation of a university’s statutory power, and with an examination of the common-law assertion of a university’s
authority over a student’s academic and non-academic
conduct, it was concluded that a university does prima
facie have the ability to regulate Student A’s online conduct in this regard.
The paper went on to further examine whether any
of Student A’s rights would be affected should a university decide to assert this prima facie authority. First, it was
concluded that a university is not under the purview of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and
therefore does not have any legal obligations imposed by
the Charter regarding its actions with respect to students.
Secondly, a student’s possible rights to privacy in his or
her residence room were examined. It was found specifically in the context of contractual rights, that a student
in residence at the University of Western Ontario does
not have any contractual right to privacy. In no university in Canada, at the moment, can a student make a
strong claim under tort law for a violation of privacy in
these circumstances. Finally, only certain provinces have
privacy statutes that extend protection to a student in a
university residence. Overall, any claims that Student A
might have against a university should it decide to regulate his or her online conduct in these circumstances
would be tenuous.
The second issue raised in the introduction to this
paper dealt with a university’s responsibility to the public
as an Internet Service Provider. It was found that if Student A only views pornography, which is legal, his or her
university as an ISP would not be liable for any misconduct. However, if Student A receives online child pornography or obscene material as part of the viewing of
pornography discussed here, his or her university might
have a legal responsibility to control Student A’s online
conduct. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
regarding the Federal Court of Appeal’s interpretation of
Tariff 22 will thus have future implications for every
Canadian university. Currently, the Federal Court of
Appeal’s interpretation of the Copyright Board’s decision
regarding Tariff 22 181 indicates that a university might
not be found culpable under the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting distribution of obscene material or
child pornography in these circumstances, even if its
students violate sections 163 or 163.1, because the university has no relationship with the sites (content providers) being accessed by its students, and therefore
cannot be said to have authorized the possession or
transmission of the material from them. However,
according to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision
regarding Tariff 22, a university would be found liable
for copyright infringement if it was found to be caching

205
certain material. If upheld, this imposition on universities
of liability for caching, for which they would be characterized as ISPs, might be extended beyond the area of
copyright law, even so far as to impose criminal responsibility on universities in a scenario such as this one, if
Student A were found to be viewing obscene material or
child pornography.
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The last issue raised at the beginning of this paper
dealt with the different legal obligations that exist upon
a university in its relationship with Student B — a student claiming sexual harassment as a result of Student
A’s actions. A university’s potential liability under public
law, tort law, and contract law was examined.
First, it became clear that certain human rights legislation, such as the Ontario Human Rights Code, may
not be applicable to universities in this situation because
universities are not strictly in tenancy relationships with
their students in residence. However, every university in
Canada must be aware of the extending ambit of their
respective provincial human rights statutes. An examination of Canadian cases revealed that human rights legislation has been interpreted broadly to cover university
students in some circumstances. Such broad judicial
interpretation supports the broad interpretation of the
Ontario Human Rights Code, for example, articulated
by the Ontario Human Rights Commission itself. Thus,
despite the fact that a strict interpretation of subsection 7(1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code leads to the
conclusion that the Code only applies to those in a
tenancy relationship, and therefore does not apply to a
university and its residence students, it is probable that a
university in Ontario, and in fact, any university
throughout Canada, does have a duty under public law
to protect its students from discrimination and harassment as described under human rights legislation.
Given a university’s probable responsibility under
human rights legislation, this paper went on to examine
whether the creation of a poisoned environment can
constitute an act of sexual harassment sufficient to bring
it within the purview of provincial human rights statutes,
and if so, whether the private viewing of online pornography in a residence room is sufficient to create a
poisoned environment. With respect to the question of
whether the creation of a poisoned environment is an
act of sexual harassment, the Ontario Human Rights
Commission’s own interpretation, as well as recent
employment decisions, equates the creation of a
poisoned environment with sexual harassment. However, with respect to the subsequent question of whether
a student’s solitary act of viewing online pornography in
a residence room is enough to create a poisoned environment, should prohibiting poisoned environments be
part of a province’s human rights environment, it was
established that if the viewing of pornography by a residence student reasonably causes another student harm
by disrupting his or her work, study, or living environment, the position of the Ontario Human Rights Com-

mission, at least, is that this behaviour does create a
poisoned environment and is therefore an act that might
be interpreted to fall under the ambit of the Ontario
Human Rights Code. Therefore, because a university is
probably obliged under public law to protect its students
from sexual harassment, and sexual harassment has been
equated with a poisoned environment in some circumstances by some tribunals and courts, a Canadian university may well have an obligation to shield its students
from a poisoned environment. As a result, every university should be aware of the evolving definition of sexual
harassment under its respective human rights legislation.
Human rights legislation throughout Canada is constantly changing, requiring consistent vigilance both by
those to whom it applies and by those in institutions to
which it has not been traditionally applied.
Secondly, the claims a student such as Student B
described here might have against his or her university
under tort law for not protecting him or her from a
poisoned environment created through the actions of
another student, here Student A, were examined. Using
the interpretation of the University of Western Ontario’s
internal documents as an example, it was concluded
that, should a residence student seek redress for damage
incurred from the creation of a poisoned environment,
he or she would probably not be able to claim compensation from a university such as the University of
Western Ontario under either the tort of general negligence or the tort of negligent misrepresentation. It is
advisable, however, that every Canadian university analyze its own internal documents to determine whether
proceeding from its own individual circumstances it
could be found liable under the tort of general negligence or the tort of negligent misrepresentation for
failing to protect its students from sexual harassment
even though this analysis, based on the case of the University of Western Ontario, would suggest otherwise.
Finally, a university’s obligations towards its students in residence under contract were analyzed to see
whether a student such as Student B might be able to
recover from a university for damages sustained through
the activities of another student such as Student A. Every
Canadian university and its students are contractually
bound to each other, with different obligations existing
under each contract. As a result, a university must be
aware of the legal obligations placed upon itself and
upon its students by the agreements existing between
itself and its students.
Again referring to the example of the University of
Western Ontario, in return for receiving monetary fees
from students, the university only contracts to provide
education, access to computing resources and technological support, and residence accommodation. No other
contractual obligations appear to be placed on the university. In fact, the University of Western Ontario deliberately attempts to limit its liability through university
policy documents that are incorporated by reference into

its contracts with students. The students, on the other
hand, are contractually obliged, through the incorporation of these same university policies into the contracts,
to fulfil responsibilities under university policy documents. Therefore, although these contracts appear to give
the university authority to stop a student such as Student
A from viewing online pornography in his or her residence room, this relationship does not compel the university to do so and there appears to be no way that
another student, like Student B, can hold the university
contractually liable should it fail to prevent Student A’s
actions.
In summation, under its contracts and its enabling
legislation, a university can prima facie prohibit students
from viewing pornography in residence. However, the
only real possible avenue for a student in Ontario
claiming to be harmed if his or her university does not
stop students in residence from viewing pornography
appears to be through the applicable human rights legislation, although the avenue of recourse may not be successful. Indeed, whether the viewing of online pornography in a residence room can even constitute the
creation of a poisoned environment, or otherwise constitute harassment, remains uncertain.
On the other hand, if a university decides to enforce
its statutory and contractual powers and regulate a student’s online behaviour, the student viewing the pornography might claim that his or her rights were violated.
Analysis reveals that this claim against a university would
also be tenuous. For example, no privacy rights exist for
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students under the University of Western Ontario’s contracts. However, such rights do exist in a majority of
provinces under statute for a student in residence. And
there is a slim possibility that a university could incur
tortious liability for regulating a student in these circumstances.
In summation, a university must analyze its contracts with its students, its founding and enacting legislation, its internal documents, and the applicable provincial human rights legislation and jurisprudence to
determine whether it has a legal obligation under contract law, public law, criminal law, or tort law to protect
its students from the conduct of a student in residence
who views online pornography. In addition, a university
should be aware of any privacy legislation existing in its
province to determine whether a student in residence
could have cause to claim a violation of privacy should
the university attempt to regulate that student’s online
behaviour. Each university should realize that it must
balance a potential liability for not protecting its residence students from the effects of another student’s
accessing pornography in residence against a potential
liability for infringing a residence student’s rights by regulating online behaviour. Therefore, every university
must examine its legal roles as a contractual party, as an
Internet Service Provider, and as a statutory body to
determine what actions it should take, or refrain from
taking, in its policies and in its published literature, even
before an incident such as the one posited here arises, in
order to avoid liability.

Notes:
1

Various reasons might be imagined to explain this fictitious circumstance.
For example, the sound on the computer may be at high volume and the
auditory effects of the material may be heard by others, the student may
tell other students, there may be guests who witnessed the material and
then told others, etc.

2

Vanessa Gruben, a student at the University of Ottawa law school, created
a paper entitled ‘‘Online Harassment & Cyberstalking: Regulating Communication at Canadian Universities’’ for the Innovation Law Forum:
Working Paper Series 2001. Gruben states that Canadian universities
should regulate ‘‘cyberstalking’’ or ‘‘online harassment’’ to ensure equal
access to the Internet and the protection of students. Gruben concludes
that current regulation does not satisfy either objective efficiently. For
more information, see: Vanessa Gruben, ‘‘Online Harassment & Cyberstalking: Regulating Communication at Canadian Universities’’ (2001),
online: Centre for Innovation Law and Policy http://
www.innovationlaw.org/lawforum/pages/workingpaper_series.htm#student.
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5

Universities in British Columbia instead operate under the University of
British Columbia Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 468 [hereinafter UBC Act]. The
UBC Act encompasses the University of British Columbia, the University
of Victoria, Simon Fraser University, and the University of Northern
British Columbia. In Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador,
New Brunswick, the Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut,
Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and the Yukon,
universities are regulated by their own individual Acts.

6

Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s.93, reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, App. II, No. 5. [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867]:‘‘In and for each
Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education, subject and according to the following Provisions . . .’’.

7

Mpega v. Université de Moncton (2001), 240 N.B.R. (2d) 349 (N.B.C.A.) at
21 [hereinafter Mpega]: ‘‘the said policy adopted by the University is not in
doubt because it is a matter clearly within the legislative power of the
Government of New Brunswick under one or several provisions of the
Constitution Act, 1867, i.e. subsections 92(13), (14), or (16).’’

8

Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 7.

9

Ibid. ‘‘The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil
and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in
those Courts.’’

3

Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal
Code].
4 A university in Ontario is defined by the Education Act (R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
309, s. 1(a)) as ‘‘an Ontario university or post-secondary institution that is
an ordinary member of the Association of Universities and Colleges of
Canada.’’ According to the Post-Secondary Educational Choice and Excellence Act, 2000 (S.O. 2000, c. 36, Sched., s. 3), the Minister of Training,
Colleges, and Universities must consent to the establishment of a university and to its power to create internal regulations. Once established, a
university has no further guidance from provincial statues. Similarly, only
two federal statutes deal with the topic of post-secondary education, the
Canada Student Financial Assistance Act (1994, c. 28, s. 2(1)) and the
Canada Student Loans Act (R.S. 1985, c. S-23, s. 2(1)) and neither statute
defines ‘‘universities’’, but simply refers to ‘‘designated’’ or ‘‘specified educational institutions’’.

10

Ibid. ‘‘Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the
Province.’’

11

The current private legislation governing the University of Western
Ontario is An Act respecting The University of Western Ontario, referred
to as the U.W.O. Act, 1982 (An Act respecting The University of Western
Ontario, S.O. 1982, c. 92 [hereinafter U.W.O. Act, 1982], as am. by S.O.
1988, c. Pr26). The first University of Western Ontario Act was given
Royal Assent on March 7, 1878 (An Act respecting the University of
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Western Ontario, 41 Vic., c. 70). The U.W.O. Act, 1982 was created, as
stated in its preamble, to provide for the organization, government, and
administration of the University. The U.W.O. Act, 1982 details the power
and composition of the Board of Governors and the Senate, as well as the
duties of the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, and Visitor (the Lieutenant
Governor of the Province of Ontario) of the University. For further
history on the University of Western Ontario, see James J. Talman &
Ruth Davis Talman, ‘‘Western’’ — 1878-1953 (London: University of
Western Ontario, 1953), William Ferguson Tamblyn, These Sixty Year
(London: University of Western Ontario, 1938), and John R.W. GwynneTimothy, Western’s First Century (London: University of Western
Ontario, 1978).
12

13

The UBC Act, supra note 5 at section 27(2)(d ).

14

Ibid. at section 27(2)(r).

15

The UWO Act, 1982, supra note 12 at s. 19(g): The Board may ‘‘. . . create
committees to exercise any of its powers and delegate authority to such
committees or to individuals as necessary, including an executive committee that may act in the name of and on behalf of the Board between
regular meetings of the Board.’’ Examples of Board of Governors committees dealing with residences are the Campus and Community Affairs
Committee, the Property and Finance Committee, and the University
Discipline Appeal Committee.
Section 29(a): The Senate shall ‘‘create, modify, and dissolve faculty councils or committees and committees generally to exercise any of its powers,
and approve of their form and method of operation.’’
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Section 18 provides that the ‘‘government, conduct, management and
control of the University and of its property and affairs are vested in the
Board, and the Board may do such things as it considers to be for the
good of the University and consistent with the public interest.’’ More
specifically, under section 20(e), the Act gives the Board of Governors the
ability to ‘‘provide for the government and control of residences operated
and maintained by the University.’’ In addition to this mandate given to
the Board, section 29 provides the Senate with broad power over the
academic policy of the University. As a result, the Senate has the authority
to make recommendations to the Board of Governors on various matters,
including the governance and control of the university residences (section 29(j )).

Section 30(d ): The Senate may ‘‘establish such committees as the Senate
considers necessary, including an executive committee that may act in
the name and on behalf of the Senate between regular meetings of the
Senate’’. Examples of Senate committees dealing with residences are the
Senate Committee on Housing Policy (SCOHP), the Senate Committee
on Information Technology and Services (SCITS), and the Senate Committee on Student Housing (UCOSH).
16

The following documents define acceptable on-campus behaviour at the
University of Western Ontario that must be complied with by any
member of the university community when interacting with other members of the community. These documents fall under the Board of Governors’ broad power under section 18 of the U.W.O. Act, 1982, supra note
12, to oversee the ‘‘government, conduct, management and control of the
University and of its property and affairs . . . [and to] do such things as it
considers to be for the good of the University and consistent with the
public interest.’’
(A) The University of Western Ontario Code of Student Conduct,
online: UWO Governance and Institutional Information http://
www.uwo.ca/univsec/board/newcode.html [hereinafter Code of Student Conduct]. The purpose of the Code of Student Conduct,
enacted by the Board of Governors on May 3, 2001, is to (1) define
the general standard of conduct expected of students, (2) to provide
examples of conduct that may be subject to disciplinary action by
the University, (3) to provide examples of sanctions that may be
imposed, and (4) to set out the disciplinary procedures that the
University will follow upon violation of the Code. As stated in Part V
of the Code of Student Conduct — Rules, ‘‘any conduct on the part
of a student that has, or might reasonably be seen to have, an adverse
effect on the reputation or the proper functioning of the University,
or the health, safety, rights or property of the University, its members
or visitors, is subject to discipline under this Code.’’ The Board of
Governors is mandated to review the Code within three years of
initial implementation.
(B) The University of Western Ontario Health and Safety Policy,
online: The University of Western Ontario Policies and Procedures
— Section 3, http://www.uwo.ca/univsec/mapp/section1/mapp31.pdf [hereinafter Health and Safety Policy]. As stated
under Section 1.00 of this Health and Safety Policy, the university
has ‘‘an ethical as well as a legal responsibility to provide a safe

environment in which to study and to work.’’ Students, staff, and
faculty are responsible for complying with the safety requirements
and standards set out under this Policy.
(C) The University of Western Ontario Sexual Harassment Policy
and Procedures, online: The University of Western Ontario Policies
and Procedures Section — 1.11, http://www.uwo.ca/univsec/mapp/
section1/mapp111.pdf [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Policy ].
According to this Sexual Harassment Policy, the University of
Western Ontario affirms the right of every member of its community to study and work in an environment free of sexual harassment.
The Human Relations Tribunal, online: The University of Western
Ontario Policies and Procedures — Section 1.20 http://www.uwo.ca/
univsec/mapp/section1/ mapp120.pdf is authorized by the Board of
Governors to hear and adjudicate complaints of sexual harassment
under the Sexual Harassment Policy. It is the responsibility of the
President to initiate a review of this Policy and its procedures within
five years of its adoption, and to report to the Board of Governors,
through the Campus and Community Affairs Committee, providing
recommendations as may be appropriate.
17

As stated by Owen-Flood J. in Blaber v. University of Victoria (1995), 123
D.L.R. (4th) 255 at 38 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Blaber], internal university
policies are ‘‘best characterized as a set of rules establishing the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for all members of the University community.’’

18

York University v. Bloxam (1984), 15 Admin. L.R. 51 (Ont. Sm. Cl. Ct.). In
this case, the defendant was a student in residence who was found to
have damaged some door knobs and an intercommunications device of
the residence. The Court determined at paragraph 7 that, pursuant to the
York University Act, 1965, 13-14 Elizabeth II, 1965, the university had the
authority to ‘‘regulate students and student activities’’. In addition, a study
by J. Wood & C. Shearing, ‘‘Securing Safety on Campus: A Case Study’’
(1998) 40 Can. J. Crim. 81, found that universities have been disciplining
the non-academic conduct of their students for years in order to prohibit
activities that are a threat to the integrity of, and the freedom to participate in, the forms of life that are central to the universities.

19

Morgan v. Acadia University (1985), 69 N.S.R. (2d) 109 at 78 (N.S.S.C.
(T.D.)) [hereinafter Morgan].

20

Ibid. at 76.

21

Act of Incorporation of Acadia University, N.S. Laws 1891, c. 134.

22

Morgan, supra note 19 at 20.

23

Morgan, ibid. at 78.

24

Glynn v. Keele University, [1971] 2 All E.R. 89 (Ch. Div.) [hereinafter
Glynn].

25

Ibid. at 91.

26

Glynn, supra note 24 at 97.

27

Healey v. Memorial University of Newfoundland (1992), 106 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 304 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.) [Healey].

28

Ibid. at 16.

29

Dickason v. The University of Alberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 at 113 [hereinafter Dickason].

30

See Re Harelkin and University of Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561, Kane v.
Board of Governors of U.B.C., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105, B.(Y.) v. W. (R.) (1985),
52 O.R. (2d) 738 (Ont. H.C.J.), Blasser v. Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning et al. (1985), 24 D.L.R. 507 (Que. C.A.), Paine v. University of Toronto (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 770 (Ont. C.A.), King v. University of
Saskatchewan, [1969] S.C.R. 678, and Blaber v. University of Victoria,
supra note 17.

31

In addition, internal university documents at the University of Western
Ontario, for example, would appear to create appropriate authority under
which the university could insist the adherence to of certain rules. For
example, under the 2002/2003 Residents’ Handbook and Understandings (available in print or online: Housing Services http://www.uwo.ca/
hfs/housing/residences/index?safety.htm~mainframe [hereinafter
Residents’ Handbook], which is incorporated by reference into the residence contract signed by every student in residence (discussed more fully
later) states at page 52:
Behaviours that erode the spirit of diversity within the residence
community will not be tolerated. Examples of these behaviours
include communicating racist or sexist jokes, hate literature, pornographic material, as well as other material that may be offensive to
others. This policy includes verbal communication or the posting or
publishing of material, written or electronic, within the residence,
including in your residence room, or via the University’s network,
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Department, the author has been assured that the Residents’ Handbook at the University of Western Ontario will be changed for
2003-04 to reflect the specific prohibitions on obscenity and child
pornography, in compliance with sections 163(1) and 163.1 of the
Criminal Code.

including RezNet. If you contravene this policy, you will face disciplinary sanctions [emphasis added].
However, this policy is not part of any document passed by the University Senate or Board of Governors. Also, it does not speak directly to the
behaviour under discussion, the viewing of online pornography by Student A, nor communicating the pornography. Finally, as described
below, other considerations may make the policy ultra vires the university.

42

The only other internal university document dealing with the protection
of a student’s privacy is The University of Western Ontario Guidelines on
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy, online: University of
Western Ontario http://www.uwo.ca/univsec/mapp/section1/mapp123.pdf [hereinafter UWO Guidelines on Access to Information and Privacy], which regulates the distribution of a student’s personal
records, but does not specify a student’s right to either personal or private
space.

43

See: Philip H. Osborne, The Law of Torts (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000)
[Osborne, The Law of Torts] at 231.

44

Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R.145.

45

Corlett-Lockyer v. Stephens, [1996] B.C.J. No. 857 (B.C. Prov. Ct. (Civ.
Div.)). In addition, in Aubry v. Les Editions Vice-Versa, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591
at 64 [hereinafter Aubry], the Supreme Court of Canada stated in obiter,
‘‘. . . it is important to bear in mind that our law is characterized by
recognition of interrelated rights whose purpose is to strengthen the
democratic ideal. Individual freedom is at the heart of that ideal.’’ See also
Motherwell v. Motherwell 1976), 1 A.R. 47 (Alta. S.C. (A.D.)) for an extension of the common law right to privacy.

46

Lipiec v. Borsa (1996), 31 C.C.L.T. (2d) 294 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.), Burnett v.
The Queen (1979), 23 O.R. (2d) 109 (Ont. H.C.J.), F.(P.) v. Ontario (1989),
47 C.C.L.T. 231 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter Charter].
33 Ibid.
34 McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter
McKinney] and affirmed in Harrison v. University of British Columbia,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 451 [hereinafter Harrison].
35 Ibid.
36 In Blaber, supra note 18, the Court held, at paragraph 31, that while the
decision in McKinney, supra note 34, dealt with a mandatory retirement
policy, in Blaber ibid., there was no reason to come to a different result
when dealing with the discipline of a student.
37 At the University of Western Ontario, in addition to internal university
documents created to apply to students, the University Students’ Council
(U.S.C.) also created a policy that is meant to be adhered to by its
members — every undergraduate student affiliated with the main
campus and the colleges. The U.S.C. is a corporation created in 1962 as a
service owned and operated by the students of the University of Western
Ontario. The mandate of the U.S.C is to enhance the educational experience for every student at U.W.O. As such, it has created a policy dealing
with student behavior and sexual harassment. The Declaration of the
Canadian Student, online: U.S.C. http://www.usc.uwo.ca/documents/
policies_procedures/statement_policies.htm [hereinafter Declaration of
the Canadian Student], addresses issues to ensure that ‘‘the Canadian
Student has the right to be free to continue her education without any
material, economic, social, or psychological barriers created by the
absence of real equality or essential conditions.’’ A specific section in this
Declaration deals with the creation of poisoned environments as a significant and unreasonable interference in a person’s environment. In addition, under Part V Exceptions, the Declaration states that:
. . . freedom of expression is the cornerstone of education at U.W.O.,
but, like other rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, it is not an absolute right. The Charter guarantees:
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication.
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are ‘‘. . . subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.’’ Human rights, for example,
may place limits on those freedoms. The implementation of this Policy
shall adhere to the Charter. However, the U.S.C. has no statutory
authority over the regulation of students. The only possible means by
which the U.S.C. could enforce its policy is to prohibit access to U.S.C.owned operations (i.e., the campus bars or the campus movie theatre).
This U.S.C. document has not been approved by either the Board of
Governors or the Senate.
38 Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Policies and Procedures,
online: Ryerson University http://www.ryerson.ca/equity/dhpspolicy.htm#Poisoned%20Environment.
39 Morgan, supra note 19 at 78.
40 Ibid. at 78.
41 It may be noted that on the evidence of an internal university document,
the University of Western Ontario has assumed the responsibility of
regulating the possession of pornography in residence. The Residents’
Handbook, supra note 31, currently states at page 51 that:
in accordance with those sections of the Criminal Code of Canada
(e.g., section 163), pornography, any obscene material, or child pornography cannot be possessed in residence. Please note that we
consider the file share function of RezNet to be a public domain,
therefore you will not use this area for file sharing of pornographic
materials. [emphasis added].
Although, as will be discussed further below, under the Criminal Code,
it is illegal to possess obscene material or child pornography in particular, the Handbook states that it is against Residence Policy for any
pornography ‘‘that erodes the spirit of diversity’’ to be found in the
residence, including in the private rooms. However, after talking with
the Computing Resources Unit of the Housing and Ancillary Services

47

Roth v. Roth (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 740 at 21 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).

48

Federal Privacy Act, R.S. 1985, c. P-21. In addition, although the concept
of privacy is an integral part of many of the fundamental freedoms in
section 2 and the legal rights in sections 7 to 15 of the Charter, the term
‘‘privacy’’ does not actually appear in the Charter and no claim for
privacy protection per se can be made on the basis of the Charter. In any
case, as stated previously, a university is not under the ambit of the
Charter. Even if it was, as argued above, and if privacy were protected by
the Charter, the protection of the right to be free from sexual harassment
may justify under section 1 of the Charter certain privacy infringements.

49

British Columbia Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373.

50

Newfoundland Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22.

51

Saskatchewan Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24.

52

Manitoba Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P-125.

53

Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c-12. See Aubry,
supra note 45, for an application of this right to privacy in Quebec.

54

Quebec Civil Code, S.Q. 1991, c. 64.

55

See John D.R. Craig, ‘‘Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The
Common-Law Tort Awakens’’ (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 355 for arguments as
to why the common-law provinces should recognize a tort of invasion of
privacy throughout Canada.

56

Subsection 163(5) states: ‘‘For the purposes of this section, the motives of
an accused are irrelevant.’’ However, should intent be relevant, it can be
said that because an ISP can choose whether or not to cache information
sent to and/or from its users (which will be mentioned later), it has the
intent to commit an offence under the Criminal Code when it does
cache illegal material.

57

No definition of any of these terms is available in the Criminal Code.

58

Available at http://www.uca.edu/divisions/general/gencounsel/copyright/dmca.asp.

59

Available at http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/
dmcaisp.htm.

60

Available at http://www.sce.cornell.edu/exec/cpl_sessions.php#!SPLiable.

61

Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Doe (2000), 12 C.P.C. (5th) 103 at 19 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). In
this case, a motion was allowed to the plaintiffs, pursuant to the Ontario
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rules 30.10 and 31.10, to
require an Internet Service Provider to identify the sender of an e-mail
message. The plaintiffs had commenced an action against an anonymous
e-mail user who had sent a defamatory message to approximately 75
employees of Irwin Toy. The plaintiffs knew the e-mail address and thus
the Internet Service Provider of the sender of the message. However, the
Internet Service Provider would not disclose the identity of the sender
without a court order. The Court ordered the Internet service provider to
disclose the identity of the sender of the message. While the anonymous
transmission of Internet messages ensures some degree of anonymity, the
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Court held that in this situation, where a prima facie case against an
anonymous user had been established, disclosure of the user’s identity
was appropriate.

which could not be held liable for defamatory statements made in news
publications absent showing that it knew or had reason to know of
defamation.’’ This case has been followed by others such as Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy, NY Misc Lexis 229 (1995) and Zeran v. America
Online Inc., (1997) 129 F 3d 327 (1997). However, once the ISP has
become aware of the customer’s activity, or should have become aware of
the activity with reasonable diligence, American courts have been much
more likely to hold the ISP liable for its customer’s actions. According to
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F.Supp. 679 (U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D.
California 1994) at 11, in reliance on Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Management Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971),
‘‘one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
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Netcom, 923 F.Supp. 1231 (1995) that ‘‘where a defendant had knowledge of the primary infringer’s infringing activities, it will be held liable if
it induced, caused or materially contributed to the infringing conduct of
the primary infringer.’’
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Service Providers is supported by the memorandum ‘‘Internet Service
Provider Liability for Online Defamation’’ (7 February 2000), online:
Torys LLP http://www.torys.com.
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charged with the publication of defamatory material. In the past, any
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One theory on the relationship between an Internet Service Provider
and its users is provided by Professor Ian Kerr of the University of
Ottawa. He states in his paper ‘‘The Legal Relationship Between Online
Service Providers and Users’’ (2001) 35 Can. Bus. L.J. 1, that some provider-user relationships display all of the elements of a fiduciary relationship.
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conditions and rules concerning the information, it didn’t interfere with
the lawful use of the technology, and it acted expeditiously to remove or
to disable access to the information it had stored upon obtaining actual
knowledge of the fact that the information is illegal or infringing.
In the United States, if an ISP has been unaware of the behavior of its
customers, most American courts have been reluctant to hold the ISP
liable for that behavior. For example, the court held in Cubby Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc., 776 F Supp 135 (1991) at 135 that ‘‘a computer service
company that provided its subscribers with access to electronic library of
news publications put together by independent third party and loaded
onto company’s computer banks was a mere ‘distributor’ of information,

The United States’ Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, 1998 HR 2281 [hereinafter DMCA] deals with online situations
in a way which has no parallel in Canadian legislation. The DMCA
limits the potential liability of an ISP, but states that ISPs must respond
to notices of alleged infringement in order to avoid contributory liability. In addition, in the United States, an ISP can also be charged with
vicarious liability if it (1) had the right and ability to control the
infringer’s acts and (2) received a direct financial benefit from the
infringement. See RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayson Co., 845
F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1988).
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supra note 31, states in bold that ‘‘. . . the Human Rights Codes for
Canada and Ontario, and the regulations of The University of Western
Ontario will be respected and observed.’’
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(RSBC 1996, c. 210) refer to a ‘‘landlord’’ under the section regarding
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Rights Code, 1988 do not use the word ‘‘landlord’’. Rather, in Saskatchewan, the word ‘‘owner’’ is used rather than ‘‘landlord’’ (s. 11(2)). The
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act simply states under subsection 5(1) that
‘‘no person shall in respect of (b) accommodation discriminate against an
individual or class of individuals . . .’’ [emphasis added]. Similarly, under
subsection 6(1) of the Newfoundland Human Rights Code, 1988, ‘‘A
person shall not deny to or discriminate against any person or class of
persons with respect to accommodation . . .’’ [emphasis added]. The
Northwest Territories Human Rights Act, the Yukon Human Rights Act,
and the Nunavut Human Rights Act Bill have all recently been enacted
and were not available for viewing at the time of writing.
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Ontario Tenant Protection Act, S.O. 1997, c. 24 [Ontario Tenant Protection Act]. The Act came into effect on June 17,1998, replacing the Rent
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In The University of Western Ontario (Board of Governors) v. Yanush
(1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 525 (Ont. H. C.J.), it was concluded that students
were considered licensees under the Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 452, s. 4(h), and not tenants. Despite this ruling, the University of
Western Ontario Residents’ Handbook advises students to get a standard
tenant’s insurance policy — perhaps indicating an acceptance of a tenancy relationship.

82

Re British American Oil Co. v. DePass, [1960] O.R. 71 (Ont. C.A.).
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Mpega, supra note 7.
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Ibid. at 59. This case involved a student who had sexually assaulted a
fellow student. The issue was whether the Université de Moncton had
jurisdiction to hear and rule on a complaint by a female student against a
male student under a policy entitled ‘‘Sexual and Sexist Harassment
Policy’’ which the university duly adopted in 1991. While the Court
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unanimously held that the university could regulate sexual harassment
issues, sexual assault was outside the jurisdiction of the university.
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University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 [hereinafter
Berg].
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British Columbia Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22, s. 3. On
December 31, 1996, the British Columbia Human Rights Act became
the British Columbia Human Rights Code, supra note 79.
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1988, supra note 79, ‘‘harass’’ is defined under subsection 2(g) as ‘‘to
engage in a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or
ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.’’ In the Manitoba
Human Rights Code, supra note 92, ‘‘harassment’’ is defined under section 19(2) as
(a) a course of abusive and unwelcome conduct or comment undertaken or made on the basis of any characteristic referred to in
subsection 9(2); or

The Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 80, does not state that the
services and facilities must be those customarily available to the public.
Rather, the Ontario Human Rights Code broadly states in Part I, Section
I, that ‘‘Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to
services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race,
ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex,
sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status or handicap.’’

(b) a series of objectionable and unwelcome sexual solicitations or
advances; or
(c) a sexual solicitation or advance made by a person who is in a
position to confer any benefit on, or deny any benefit to, the
recipient of the solicitation or advance, if the person making
the solicitation or advance knows or ought reasonably to
know that it is unwelcome; or

British Columbia Human Rights Act, supra note 87:

(d ) a reprisal or threat of reprisal for rejecting a sexual solicitation or
advance.

3. No person, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, shall
(a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service
or facility customarily available to the public, or

In the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, supra note 79, paragraph 3(o)
defines ‘‘sexual harassment’’ as

(b) discriminate against a person

(a) a course of abusive and unwelcome conduct or comment undertaken or made on the basis of any characteristic referred to in
subsection9(2); or
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because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital
status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex or sexual orientation of that person or class of persons.
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Examples of cases that followed this reasoning include Beattie v. Governors of Acadia University (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 466 (N.S.S.C. (A.D.)) and
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Citizenship, and Multiculturalism Act, supra note 79), Prince Edward
Island (Human Rights Act c. H-12), Manitoba (Human Rights Code,
c. H-175), Quebec (Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, supra note
50), and New Brunswick (Human Rights Act c. H-11) also refer to ‘‘services customarily available to the public’’, and therefore the reasoning in
Berg, supra note 86, would have direct application.
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(d ) a reprisal or threat of reprisal for rejecting a sexual solicitation or
advance.
The human rights statutes in the other Canadian provinces, supra
notes 79 and 92, all use similar language in their definitions of
‘‘harassment’’ or ‘‘sexual harassment’’.
Updated and re-approved by the Commission on September 10, 1996.

Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2
S.C.R. 181 [hereinafter Bhadauria]. In this case, Ms. Bhadauria was an
employee of Seneca College, and therefore was protected by the Ontario
Human Rights Code, supra note 77, which applies to employees. Chief
Justice Lamer’s point is that, unlike Ms. Bhadauria, students are not able
to rely on the Code for protection, and because it has already been
determined that the Charter does not apply to universities, and the courts
are reluctant to create new torts, then the only available recourse is to
ensure that the British Columbia Human Rights Act, supra note 87, will
protect students from discrimination.

101

Policy Statement on Sexual Harassment and Inappropriate GenderRelated Comment and Conduct, online: Ontario Human Rights Commission http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/publications/sexual-harassmentpolicy.shtml [hereinafter OHRC Policy Statement].
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The British Columbia Human Rights Code, supra note 79, which as
mentioned above replaced the British Columbia Human Rights Act,
supra note 87, in 1996, does not mention harassment either.

Ibid. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in Bannister v. General Motors of
Canada Ltd. (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 577 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Bannister]
relied on the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s definition of a
‘‘poisoned environment’’ as possibly being a single instance of inappropriate conduct that may be a violation of the Ontario Human Rights
Code if it creates a poisoned environment.
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The Ontario Human Rights Commission was established in 1961 to
administer the Code. The Commission is an agency of the Ontario
government accountable to the Minister of Citizenship.
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Two e-mails were directed to Rosarina_Tassone/
OHRC.ON.CA@OHRC.ON.CA, the e-mail address available on the
OHRC home page for inquiries. The first e-mail, sent on November 7,
2002, asked: ‘‘Does the Ontario Human Rights Code apply to university
residences? In other words, is a university residence a type of ‘accommodation’ that is covered by the Code?’’ The response received stated: ‘‘Yes,
the Code applies to residences and all other locations.’’ The second email, sent on November 12, 2002, asked: ‘‘Does the Code apply to a
university residence because the Code sees residences and students in a
landlord/tenant relationship, or because the Code applies to every single
type of accommodation available?’’ The response was: ‘‘The Code
applies to every type of accommodation.’’

This is backed up by other definitions given of a poisoned environment,
including the one posted on the Peel District School Board Web site
online: http://www.gobeyondwords.org/policy_1.htm, which states that
‘‘. . . comments or actions can still poison the environment for someone
even if they are not made directly to that person or another employee or
student.’’ It is important to note, however, that in Canadian Union of
Postal Workers and Canada Post Corp. (Perchaluk Grievance), [1997]
C.L.A.D. No. 208 (Freedman), the arbitrator considered whether a corporation is required to ‘‘take its victim as it finds her’’ (i.e., ultra-sensitive),
or if there are ‘‘degrees of offensiveness’’ from which a corporation is
required to protect an employee. The Board never answered these questions, but did acknowledge that one of the actions in the case that
allegedly created the poisoned environment was not something that
‘‘any employer could reasonably expect or anticipate.’’ Nevertheless,
when taking all of the discriminatory events and actions together, the
Board found that a poisoned environment had been created.
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Guide to the Human Rights Code, online: Ontario Human Rights
Commission http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/publications/hr-codeguide/pdf at 8.
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See Bannister, supra note 102 and Ford Motor Company of Canada Ltd.
v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2001), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 465
(Ont. C.A.).
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Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2
S.C.R. 536.
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As mentioned above, this conclusion was first stated in McKinney, supra
note 34, and affirmed in Harrison, supra note 34.

(b) a series of objectionable and unwelcome sexual solicitations or
advances; or
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In addition, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dickason,
supra note 29 at 36 and 113, a party cannot contract out of its obligations
under human rights legislation. This is supported by Ontario Human
Rights Commission v. Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202 at
213-214, and Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink,
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 158 [hereinafter Heerspink].
Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 77 at s. 10(1). The definition of
‘‘sexual harassment’’ is quite similar in various other provincial human
rights statutes. For example, in the Newfoundland Human Rights Code,
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Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84 at 89.

122

Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 [hereinafter Cooper].
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Various decisions also demonstrate that a poisoned environment can
also be linked to discrimination based on race in certain circumstances.
See for example, Chiswell v. Valdi Foods 1987 Inc. (1994), 25 C.H.R.R.
D/400 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry).
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O.H.R.C. and Matsuinch Abdolalipour and Raed Murad v. Allied Chemical Canada Ltd. (18 September 1996), Ontario (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry),
online: OHRC http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/cases/summary-1996.shtml. In addition, librarians have been increasingly complaining about the pornography viewed by patrons. In fact, in Ottawa,
librarians have filed grievances through CUPE arguing that the patrons’
public viewing of pornography has created a poisoned environment, an
act of harassment. For more information, see Ian Gillespie ‘‘Libraries
struggle with porn dilemma’’ The London Free Press (12 February 2003)
B1. Unfortunately, the rising number of employees viewing online pornography at City Hall in London, Ontario, for example, would indicate
that aggressive measures in certain circumstances to decrease the creation of poisoned environments through the public viewing of pornography are not adequate or effective. See Mary-Jane Egan & Joe Belanger,
‘‘City workers disciplined for viewing porn at work’’ The London Free
Press (1 May 2003) A1.

See: Powlett and Powlett v. University of Alberta et al. (1934), Alta. S.C.
(Ap. Div.); Kevin Kooy v. The University of Lethbridge, Governors of the
University of Lethbridge and Seamus F. O’Shea (1993), A.C.Q.B.; Pratt v.
University of Lethbridge (2001), A.B.C.A. 134; Ramsaroop v. University
of Toronto (unreported, June 28, 2001, Ont. C.A.); and Canadian Universities’ Reciprocal Insurance v. Halwell Mutual Insurane Company
(2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 113.
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In addition, the University of Western Ontario’s Students’ Services
Statement on Human Rights, online: Student Services http://
www.registrar.uwo.ca/accals/2002/sec_14.htm [hereinafter Statement
on Human Rights] was created by the University of Western Ontario’s
Equity Services department, in conjunction with the Student Development Centre, to affirm the University of Western Ontario’s ‘‘wish to
ensure the full and fair implementation of the principles of the
Ontario Human Rights Code ’’ (as stated in the introduction) The
UWO Equity Services: Info Sheet — Harassment and Discrimination,
online: Equity Services http://www.uwo.ca/equity/docs/harassment.pdf
[hereinafter Equity Services: Harassment and Discrimination] confirms
and supports the University’s belief that every member of the university community has the right to a work and study environment that is
free from harassment and discrimination. In addition, Equity Services
states that the creation of a poisoned environment is an example of an
act of sexual harassment that has the potential to violate every student’s
right to feel safe and comfortable (For further information, see UWO
Equity Services: Definitions , online: Equity Services http://
www.uwo.ca/equity/definitions.htm [hereinafter Equity Services: Definitions]). However, it must be remembered that because this latter
document has not been approved by the Board of Governors or the
Senate, it may not be binding.
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In addition, should there be a situation where there was a high
probability of risk of sexual harassment for students in residence (i.e., if
there had been previous incidents of sexual harassment), it may be
possible through an analogy to Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto
(Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 487 (Ont.
Gen. Div.) to state that there is a special relationship of proximity
between the university and its students in residence that places a duty
upon the university to protect its students from sexual harassment. In
Jane Doe, the Toronto Commissioners of Police were found to have
failed their duty to protect Jane Doe from sexual assault. This duty was
placed upon them once they became aware of the high probability of
Ms. Doe being a victim of sexual assault from a local serial rapist.
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See Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.).
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However, because universities would want to ensure their coverage
should liability occur, they would probably raise the cost of tuition or
set aside most of their government funding for these exigencies.

The University of Western Ontario, for example, has explicitly indicated
that it is concerned with protecting its students from poisoned environments. While the UWO Sexual Harassment Policy & Procedures, supra
note 17, does not mention a ‘‘poisoned environment’’ specifically, two
other internal university documents do. First, the 2002-03 Residents’
Handbook & Understandings, supra note 31, states that:
we [the university] do not condone the posting of any material that
can be deemed to contribute to a poisonous environment — an
environment that promotes unwanted comments and/or conduct
contributing to a negative community atmosphere, including the
posting of discipline letters [emphasis added].
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In the American case of Rupp v. Bryan, 417 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1982), the
Court established that the extent of the duty a school owes to its
students should be limited by the amount of control the school has
over the student’s conduct. However, in another American case, Nova
Southeastern University Inc. v. Gross, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S243 (Fla. Mar.
30, 2000) [hereinafter Gross], it was stated that a university may not act
without regard to the consequences of its actions because every other
legal entity is charged with acting as a reasonably prudent person
would in like or similar circumstances. For example, as stated in Gross,
universities have the duty to make some effort to avoid placing students with an employer likely to harm them.
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and a reconsideration of the Board’s decision does not satisfy a party to
the proceedings, the matter can be filed in the Divisional Court (s. 42(2)).
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For example, the University of Western Ontario, through its Information Technology Services, already assumes the right to act once it has
received notice of a violation of the Acceptable Use Agreement: University’s Code of Behavior for Use of Computing Resources and Corporate
Data, online: The University of Western Ontario Policies and Procedures — Section 1.12 http://www.uwo.ca/univsec/mapp/section1/mapp113.pdf [hereinafter Acceptable Use Agreement ]. As well,
the Residents’ Handbook, supra note 32, states that RezNet can not be
used for file sharing of pornographic materials and, again, ITS will react
if given notice of a violation. The student against whom notice has been
given will be cut off and denied service through the University’s system.
Of course, in this case, this might precipitate the litigation which would
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this paper.
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Western Ontario, no survey has been conducted by the University of
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For example, at the University of British Columbia, incoming MBA
students filed two lawsuits in September 2002 over a 400% fee increase.
One writ alleged breach of contract on the part of U.B.C. The other
asked for an injunction to halt the increase, claiming that it was ‘‘unfair,
unreasonable and unconscionable’’. For further information, see:
Monday Magazine, online: Monday Publications http://
www.mondaymag.com/Monday/editorial/39_2002/features.htm.
In addition, a U.K. university student sued her university college for
breach of contract, stating that she had to quit her studies because of
bad teaching and poor supervision. She settled out of court for
£30,000 for future loss of earnings. For more information, see: Natalie
Shaw The World Today (6 August 1999), online: ABC News Online
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/s42093.htm.
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Examples of unsuccessful American cases include: Susan M. v. New York
Law School, 76 N.Y. 2d 241 (N.Y.Ct. App. 1990), Morales v. New York
University, 83 A.D. 2d 811 (1981), Regents of University of Michigan v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), Morpurgo v. United States, 437 F. Supp.
1135 (1977), Connely v. University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (1965),
Maas v. Corporation of Gonzaga University, 618 P.2d 106 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980).
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For more information, see S. Schollum, Education Litigation: Students
Suing Institutions And Supervisors: The New Dimension in ‘‘Education
Malpractice’’, online: Auckland University of Technology Conferences
http://www.aut.ac.nz/conferences/innovation/papersthemetwo/schollumpapertwo.pdf.
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In the problem being addressed, the computer is assumed to be the
property of the student rather than the property of the University of
Western Ontario.
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According to the Computer Resources Unit for the UWO Housing and
Ancillary Services Department, during the 2003/2003 school year, 96%
of students in residence on main campus used RezNet. The remaining
four per cent includes students who did not acquire Internet access at
all, along with those who used independent ISPs.
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In addition, through the use of various file sharing programs, such as
Kazaa and the Windows File Sharing tool, students in residence at the
University of Western Ontario can make information available for
public file sharing. Specifically, with regards to the Windows File
Sharing tool, due to the protocol of the program, users can only access
files provided by others in their specific networks or sub-networks. A
university residence, for example, would have its own network and
possibly sub-networks depending on the number of computers using
RezNet. In order for someone to access another’s files, it is necessary to
search and open the file. In others words, the possibility of viewing
unwanted material is slim. If someone does have an issue with the
content of another’s files, the administrators of RezNet act on a complaint basis. Once a complaint is received, RezNet investigates and sends
e-mails requesting that the material be removed. RezNet does not proactively monitor the files on RezNet users’ computers, although it occasionally conducts audits and surveys on hard drives to ensure that they
are sufficiently protected from hackers.
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See footnote 164.
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Acceptable Use Agreement, supra note 133.
Acceptable Use Agreement, ibid. at section 1.00.
166 The Acceptable Use Agreement, ibid., is always available on the U.W.O.
Residence Network Web page (http://www.uwo.ca/hfs/reznet/
policy.htm#) for perusal.
167 Residence Hall Network Connection Guidelines, online: RezNet Policies http://www.uwo.ca/its/reznet/policy.htm# [hereinafter Connection
Guidelines].
168 The Acceptable Use Agreement, supra note 133, does not mention the
Connection Guidelines, ibid. and therefore does not incorporate the
Connection Guidelines by reference. If the Acceptable Use Agreement
did mention the Connection Guidelines, it would be possible to argue
that the Connection Guidelines have been approved by the Board of
Governors along with the Acceptable Use Agreement and would therefore also be binding on ITS users.
169 Sexual Harassment Policy, supra note 16.
170 For example, in Blaber, supra note 17, a student was found to have
infringed his university’s policy on computer use responsibilities by
harassing another user through e-mail. As a result, the Court held that
the university’s withdrawal of the student’s computer account was
within its powers, and that there was no remedy for the student under
subsection 24(1) of the Charter because the Charter was inapplicable to
(1) the actions of the university’s anti-harassment officer and the Chair of
computing science, and (2) the university’s Sexual Harassment Policy,
supra note 16.
171 There is, however, no evidence available that any software licence
between the University of Western Ontario and the vendors specifically
mentions sexual harassment.
172 A small number of upper-year students can live in residence, but the
majority of residents are in their first year of university.
173 Residents’ Handbook, supra note 31.
174 This obligation was upheld by the Court in Morgan, supra note 20, and
reinforced by cases such as University of Ceylon v. Fernando, [1960] 1
All E.R. 631 (P.C.) and Re Polten and University of Toronto Governing
Council l (1975), 8 O.R. (2d) 749 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
175 Residents’ Handbook, supra note 31 at 50.
176 Ibid. at 51.
177 Ibid.
178 Morgan, supra note 19.
179 Code of Student Conduct, supra note 16 at section I3.
180 Residents’ Handbook, supra note 31 at 40 and 46.
181 SOCAN, supra note 64.
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